

published monthly since 1866

Fortnightly

FOUNDED IN 1865 BY ANTHONY TROLLOPE

APRIL, 1948

CMLXXVI N.S.

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THE FORTNIGHTLY

APRIL, 1948

THE MEANING OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

BY R. P. SCHWARZ

IN their public utterances, obsequious eulogists and spiteful detractors of the Marshall plan both show the same absence of critical judgment. On any unsentimental view, the motives of the European Recovery Programme are neither so completely disinterested and humanitarian as one side would have it; nor so viciously imperialistic and machiavellian as the other side proclaims. The eulogists under-estimate the strength of the impersonal forces at work in a society of which the main motive power remains the pursuit of private profit. These forces are quite powerful enough to vitiate the best intentions. The detractors have been taught to ignore the individual. For them, only the "system" counts and that, being capitalist, is wicked. But there is nothing either wholly wicked or wholly pure in this world and the Marshall plan is no exception to this rule.

(I)

In its *subjective* aspect, the Marshall plan displays some features of astonishing generosity. There is only one example of a country whose citizens have granted international relief and financial assistance on a scale proportionately as large as or even larger than that now contemplated by the United States. That country is Switzerland. Within the three years since the end of the war, it has, with exemplary modesty and a refreshing lack of fuss, made gifts and granted credits amounting in all to 2,400 million Swiss francs (nearly 600 million dollars). On a per head basis, the equivalent amount for the United States works out at 18,000 million dollars—which happens to be roughly the estimated cost of the Marshall plan for a period of four years.*

But from the psychological angle, Swiss help has been easier to achieve; Switzerland has upheld her neutrality in two world wars, but for obvious reasons, she has never known isolationism. Her moral and physical closeness to the rest of Europe, apart from a long-standing humanitarian tradition, accounts for much of her action.

The United States, like Switzerland, can pride itself on its humanitarian tradition. But for the rest, a moral hiatus, more important even than geographical distance, separates it from Europe. Not many Americans are likely to admit even now, that their entry into the 1939-1945 war follow-

* See the presidential address by Dr. R. Speich, of the Swiss Bank Corporation, Basle, at the latest annual meeting of shareholders, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of February 29, 1948.

ed largely from their own obstinate attachment to an outdated doctrine of foreign policy. For them, in their great majority, Europe remains the scapegoat. On such a view, the urge to help her cannot be very great. It would be more logical to expect that Americans, after their experience of Europe's quarrels during the last thirty years, would wish to sink that troublesome continent at the bottom of the ocean, for good and all. Nor is it likely that the mass of the American people realize even now the full extent of the changes that have occurred in their country's position. Intellectuals and internationally-minded businessmen may grasp the significance of Willkie's "one world" formula and accept its implications. But what percentage do they represent in a total population of over 140 million? And to what extent has a knowledge of world problems been able to spread among a nation which, for close on 150 years, has prided itself on having no foreign policy and has entered world politics barely five years ago?

Thus, the American citizen, faced with the Marshall plan, must first of all overcome psychological resistances with which the Swiss case provides no parallel. Though his endorsement of the plan is unlikely to involve him in actual privations, it will compel him to accept unpleasant sacrifices such as restrictions on the free consumption of goods and the maintenance of high taxation. Nor is limitation of profits quite to be excluded. For the individual, these will be concrete acts of self-denial. Their effect will be felt by the American housewife, the American wage-earner, the American businessman. In their various capacities, these people will hardly be impressed by the abstract argument that relates commitments under the plan to gross national income and goes on to show that, on a *per annum* basis, their cost will be less than three per cent. of that income at its current rate. What interests them are the repercussions on personal, not on national, income.

In these conditions, can humanitarian or even economic motives suffice to explain the acceptance of the Marshall plan by the American citizen? Generosity must not be confused with altruism. The answer is, therefore, that sums of this magnitude would not be granted either as charity or as conscience money—"for having suffered less"—or even as a large-scale contribution to unemployment insurance. Only the search for comprehensive life insurance provides a sufficiently potent motive.

(II)

According to M. Zhdanov, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the Marshall plan is "the American plan for the subjugation of Europe" and its aim is "the building up of imperialism and the preparation of the new imperialist war—struggle against socialism and democracy and the support of reactionary and anti-democratic, pro-Fascist, régimes everywhere."*

* M. Zhdanov's speech at Warsaw, at the end of September, 1947, to the representatives of the Communist parties of nine countries of Eastern Europe. See *The Times*, October 23, 1947.

These accusations are obviously half-truths. Undoubtedly imperialist forces are at work in the United States, as elsewhere. Undoubtedly, the Marshall plan might, in certain conditions, lead to the subjugation of Europe. But little though one may love American capitalism and its imperialist manifestations, power politics do not differ in essence, whether pursued by the east or by the west. The difference lies in tactics, in methods. And Russian methods have been outstandingly successful in decimating within less than three years, the ranks of those who, for good reasons, had endeavoured to keep equally apart from anti-Communism and Communism. Russian tactics, even more than Russian strategy, have compelled them to choose *la sauce à laquelle ils veulent être mangés*—and they have chosen the more nourishing one. From the Communist point of view, it may be regrettable that the governing classes in western Europe should have been successful, on the whole, in “buying off” the proletariat by the material blandishments of a higher standard of living. But without Russia’s active help they could never have succeeded to anywhere near the same degree. If the unification of western Europe were to come about under the Marshall plan, Molotov even more than Marshall would deserve a monument in every capital of the sixteen “participating countries”.

It is evident by now that Russia’s strategy of denial is associated with tactics which, from the stage of unfriendly abstention, have already passed to that of active non-belligerency. The slogan will be “every kind of sabotage short of war.” Yet, despite recent events in Czechoslovakia a real trial of strength further west—even if it were to give Russia a temporary success—is even now likely to produce as victor not a new *Commune*, but a new Thiers. In such a case, a period of revolutionary strife would be an unfortunate likelihood. Yet, after the lesson of Czechoslovakia, a revolutionary victory would pre-suppose a degree of stupidity on the part of the defenders that one would hesitate to debit against them despite their disastrous performance in inter-war years.

The Sixteen have it in their own hands to disprove M. Zhdanov’s second accusation and to avoid “subjugation” even if they cannot escape a temporary loss of independence. The latter, in any case, is a fact. It will remain the more limited in degree and in time, the more the Sixteen are led to act in unison, to co-ordinate their reconstruction plans, their economies and hence ultimately their political policies. But it will of course be untrue to claim that independence will be preserved merely because the treaties to be concluded under the Marshall plan may eschew political clauses. There is no need for the United States to spell out clauses of this kind. The treaty parchments, held against the light of sober reason, will show them as their watermark. For he who pays the piper calls the tune. The knowledge that vital outside assistance may be cut off at any moment if its beneficiary balks at toeing the line is a deterrent

far more effective than the most restrictive political clause that could possibly be conceived.

(III)

For the United States as such, as distinct from its ordinary citizen, the Marshall plan is, politically, life insurance and economically, unemployment insurance. Whatever may have been the intention of the State Department, the economic purposes of the Marshall plan have by now quite evidently become subordinate to its political aims. All false pretences have been abandoned in this field. It is no longer disguised in any way that the plan is designed to ensure to the United States those allies which it will need in the event of armed conflict with the Soviet Union and to see to it that they will be *bündnisfähig*. It is for that reason that Congress is likely to accept a policy which, ten years ago, when it would have been far cheaper to follow a similar policy against Hitler it would not even have considered.

But for America, the Marshall plan has more than a political value contingent upon war with Russia. It has a very real economic value, independent of the political evolution, though the fact may be overshadowed by the political aspect. In the first place, the plan provides a means of balancing, temporarily at least, the United States' international accounts. The surplus in the United States balance of payments, constant since 1919, with the exception of the lend-lease years 1942-1944, may be an *embarras de richesses*. But the embarrassment is becoming unbearable. The extent of the surplus has been greatly increased by the world's exceptional post-war requirements. Although there is at least one British economist who claims that the world dollar shortage is "one of the most brazen pieces of collective effrontery," this solipsist impression is not shared by the numerous countries who cannot raise dollars for their most essential imports. In fact, failing dollar gifts or credits, the United States will find exceedingly few solvent buyers for its exports after mid-1948.

Even American senators are beginning to learn the facts of life. Senator Millikan, chairman of the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate, thus defined the consequences that follow from the constant surplus in his country's balance of payments :

"We have to increase our imports, even though from a selective standpoint, we may not want to import. We may not need them. Or we have to lend, or we have to give them (the debtors) our surpluses"

Would that the distinguished Senator or his predecessors had discovered these self-evident truths a few years earlier—before the Tariff Act of 1930 for instance. It is largely because the United States would not increase its imports during the inter-war period that it must to-day lend or give its surplus. Right now, the other possibilities mentioned by the Senator do

* Hearing before the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate on Trade Agreement System and Proposed International Trade Organization Charter, March 20 to April 3, 1947, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1947, page 106.

not exist. If the United States decided overnight to cancel its whole tariff, its debtors could still not, in present conditions, produce sufficient exports to pay for their imports. Payment by imports is the long-term solution. On short-term, the only way out is gifts and credits.

It must, however, be realized that such a policy is merely an expedient designed to gain time. As such, it would have to be adopted on economic grounds alone—quite apart from compelling political reasons. For, in some manner, equilibrium must be restored in the United States balance of payments. As long as this cannot be achieved by merchandise imports, only gifts, credits and, in a small measure, invisible imports (American tourist expenditure abroad and payment for services rendered by foreigners) can be used for that purpose. Besides, this expedient is useful in another way. Given the present structure of United States economy, there is a direct connection between the maintenance of exports and the volume of employment. Maintenance of the former is likely to be helpful in stabilizing the latter. Provided the United States does not, in a future depression, abruptly discontinue foreign lending, as it did in 1930, "Marshall exports" may indeed assume the functions of a vast system of unemployment insurance. Thus, as a provisional solution, the policy is valuable. But it is unlikely to provide a permanent solution of the balance of payments problem. For it is highly improbable that the United States will want to continue acting as the world's largest pension fund. Objections are bound to arise for political reasons. But politics apart, the United States cannot fail to discover in time that instead of giving away its surpluses, it can, thanks to a different distribution of national income, absorb a much larger share of the national product than heretofore.

It is only incidental, among the economic aspects of the Marshall plan that it provides, in addition, a useful corrective to the mistakes and insufficiencies, by now quite patent, of the economic policy associated with Bretton Woods and the unco-ordinated series of reconstruction loans to various European countries. Normally, the plumbers would not have turned up quite so quickly to repair the burst pipes. But then, their own workshop was in danger too.

(IV)

One would like to know how many Americans realize the fact that in its economic aspects, the Marshall plan constitutes at best a provisional solution. Yet, unless that fact is understood, the time to be gained in this manner will be frittered away. Confusion of the provisional with the definitive is bound to lead to a rude awakening later on. On this point, one can hardly be optimistic when one observes that, until now, the plan has been "sold" to the Americans—much like the loan to Britain before—under all sorts of false pretences: the pretence that it will not cause a rise in American prices—when at the very least, it will put the brakes on any reduction; that it will not cause shortages in the American markets—that, in a large measure, will depend on how exports are organized; that

it will increase the chances of free multilateral trade and thereby act as a stimulant to "free enterprise" all over the world—as though that did not mainly depend on the American attitude to imports after the completion of the Marshall plan. For the time being, in any case, the United States, regardless of its doctrinal position, is being compelled, by overwhelming force of circumstances, to engage in the greatest experiment of economic planning ever attempted. It is an aggravating circumstance that it must carry out this experiment in the field of international economic relations, the one field from which even intrepid planners have shrunk so far on account of the particular difficulties involved. Supreme irony—the planning of exports, necessary under the Marshall plan, must inescapably lead to a considerable degree of planning of production and distribution, that is, of domestic economy as a whole.

(V)

What the Marshall plan means, respectively, to each side, does not seem to be any clearer to Europeans than it is to Americans. There are, of course, those who are satisfied with its immediate advantages. Mostly they are also those who seem to have reconciled themselves to the permanent supersession of Europe by the younger and more vigorous power of the United States. Having resigned themselves to this situation, all they want is a reasonably liberal life annuity from the American pension fund. Now, it may well be that Europe will prove unable to recover her former rôle in the world and that the lead has definitely passed to the other side of the Atlantic. But all that Europe can expect to get is a terminable annuity—and terminable at short notice.

Thus, in her case, time is even more precious. Europe, in the short space of four years, has to rebuild the main structure of her economy and to adapt it to utterly changed circumstances. Like the United States, although for different reasons, she has failed to achieve this adaptation during the inter-war period—necessary though it was even then. For the Sixteen the chief value of the Marshall plan derives from the possibility it offers of achieving economic, as well as moral, recovery in conditions of relative political freedom. If that were not the deeper meaning of the plan, there would be no reason to decline the Soviet recipe for Europe. As Monsieur Bertrand de Jouyenel pointed out recently *, it would be far more logical, for economic reasons, to integrate industrialized western Europe with the agricultural east rather than with the even more industrialized United States. It would also be easier to accomplish. The question is only at what level and cost a new equilibrium could be attained.

It is evident that the eastern solution would mean a drop in the standard of living to a level considerably lower than anything western Europe has been accustomed to for a long time. It would not therefore be accepted by common consent; it could only be enforced after the disappearance of

* See his editorial in *Economie contemporaine*, Paris, July-September, 1947, published by *Centre de recherches et de documentation économiques*.

democratic institutions. Now, western Europe may have become sceptical of the performance of these institutions. She may even at times doubt the positive value of democracy. But she is still unlikely to adopt a régime under which even symphonies must follow "the path of Socialist realism."*

Thus, to take it at its lowest value the Marshall plan is for western Europe the lesser of two evils. It may involve a temporary loss of independence. But that is merely acknowledging a fact. The plan, if it is consciously used for this purpose, offers at least a chance of recovering independence. That would be true had it even been deliberately designed for imperialistic ends. For, if it is successful, Europe will recover her solvency. But economic solvency and political independence are largely conterminous. A solvent Europe can recover much, if not all, of her former economic and political importance. It is a power factor not to be despised by either side—and that remains true even if its political frontier runs along the Elbe. Before the war, the sixteen Marshall countries had a population of 206 millions (of 245 if Western Germany is included); their imports (without Western Europe) represented 40.8 per cent., their exports 30.4 per cent. of total world trade and they owned 58.6 per cent. of the world's shipping.

If the "participating countries" recover their former economic strength, clearly, their rôle in world economy would again be considerable. Is it not for this reason that the United States is seeking their alliance, that Soviet Russia is trying to prevent that alliance? Weak allies have never been welcome. Western Europe, economically co-ordinated, hence politically far more unified than she has ever been before, would constitute that third force that seems indispensable to achieve something like economic and political equilibrium in the world. If peace is maintained for the next five years and the stage of recovery can thus be reached, such a third force may even be a decisive factor in preventing east and west from settling their disputes by arms. Even some outside pressure, some compulsion towards unity, some loss of independence, do not seem too high a price to pay for that result.

(VI)

Implicit in this conception of the Marshall plan is the assumption that western Europe still possesses a spirit of her own, the belief also that, for different reasons and with greater or lesser vigour, she rejects both the Russian and the American way of life. This assumption may prove over-optimistic. Her spirit may be too broken, her organism too weak, after two world wars in short succession, for such an assertion of independence. The decline of liberal tradition in western Europe is, from that angle, a bad symptom. Time only can test our real condition.

* Having been criticized by the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the "formalistic and anti-popular tendencies" of his music, the Soviet composer Khachaturian said that criticism would help him "to adopt the path of Socialist realism in musical art." *The Times*. February 17, 1948.

THE CHURCHES AND THE IRON CURTAIN

BY STEPHEN NEILL

IN August of this year, the World Council of Churches will hold its first Assembly at Amsterdam ; it will then emerge out of the condition of " in process of formation " in which, through the exigencies of the war, it has continued for nearly ten years, and will become a regularly constituted body.

It must be obvious that the grandiose title reflects an aspiration rather than a present reality. The Roman Catholic Church, claiming itself to be *the Church* and to have within itself the fullness of truth and of authority, cannot have any official relationship with a body which recognizes the existence of *Churches*. It may, and does, take a friendly interest in the movement towards closer fellowship between great bodies of separated Christians ; it cannot go further than personal contacts between individuals without official sanction or support. This must be taken to be a closed question. There is another question which is open, and is of singular import for the future of the world-movement of the Christian Churches. Will the Church of Russia be among the hundred and fifty Churches represented at Amsterdam, or will it be conspicuous by its absence ?

The iron curtain is the ever present reality by which all contemporary statesmanship is conditioned. The Churches are not free from the same conditioning influence. But their experience is rather different from that of States, since the Church itself exists on both sides of the iron curtain, and, in spite of all that tends towards separation, is still conscious of its underlying unity as the body of Christ on earth. Can this unity be more than a vague inherited tradition, a gossamer ideal for an undetermined future ? Or can it be a factor in contemporary situations ?

Evidence about the Church in Russia is now becoming available in considerable quantities. But it is difficult to interpret, and especially difficult for a western observer to be sure that he is not distorting the picture by the injection of western pre-suppositions irrelevant to the life of an eastern Church. It is certain that the Russian Church has survived the days of conflict with the State, weakened but not destroyed. It is certain that, through its ardent co-operation in the war of liberation, it has won for itself a position of toleration such as would have seemed quite unattainable in a not very distant past. Apparently bishops have been provided for vacant sees, and the work of theological training seriously taken in hand. Of the numbers of the faithful, and of the age-groups to which they belong, most conflicting reports are received, all the discrepant statements being put forth with the utmost confidence.

What is, however, more important than almost anything else, is that the

Moscow patriarchate of the present day seems to regard itself as in all respects the heir of the Russian Church of earlier days. It has never been easy for dwellers in western Europe to feel at home with the mystical, almost messianic, belief of Russians in their country as the holy land, from which one day salvation is to come to all the earth. It is perhaps even harder for western Christians to take as seriously as Russian Christians do the idea of the Russian as the one true Church, as that alone in which Christianity is fully expressed, and the head of which is naturally and inevitably the head of all Christians throughout the world. We are much more familiar with the similar claims of the Bishop of Rome. It is not easy to understand how we can be regarded as sheep who have somehow strayed from the Orthodox fold, and who, in our separation, can hope only to receive, and that as it were by divine oversight, some crumbs that fall from the table of grace spread in its plenitude. Yet that is exactly the way in which the Orthodox regard members of all western Churches ; the west has lost the true light ; the time must come when the light of the Gospel will go forth from Russia over the whole of the unfaithful world, and over all the degenerate Churches. The concept of Moscow as the Third Rome has survived all the vicissitudes of the Revolution. As early as the end of the fifteenth century, the doctrine was set forth by the Abbot Philotheos : " The Church of ancient Rome fell because of Apollinarian heresy. As to the second Rome—the Church of Constantinople—it has been hewn by the axes of Ishmaelites, but this third new Rome—the Holy Apostolic Church, under thy mighty rule, shines throughout the entire world more brightly than the sun. All the Orthodox Christian realms have converged in thine own. Thou art the sole Autocrat of the universe, the only Czar of the Christians. . . . Observe and hearken, O pious Czar, two Romes have fallen, but the third stands, and no fourth can ever be. Thy Christian Empire shall fall to no one's lot." Ideas are effective in proportion not to the strength of their foundation in objective fact, but to the tenacity with which they are held. It can hardly be doubted that Russian ecclesiastics of the post-revolutionary era regard themselves as inheritors of the glories and the tasks of the third and last Rome.

The disappearance of the Christian prince from the Orthodox world has, indeed, brought about a certain crisis in Orthodox thought. The God-defended Emperor played a larger part in the life of the eastern Church than even Charlemagne or Henry Tudor in the politics of the Churches in the west. Now, for the first time since Constantine there is no Christian Emperor. (It is unlikely that the one Orthodox prince left, the king of Greece, would put in a claim to be the successor of the Emperor of Byzantium.) But the disappearance of the prince only lends greater glory to the patriarchal throne of Moscow, and to the prelate who has been seated on it.

There is good reason to think that the actions and policies of the Moscow

patriarchate are determined by this conception of the office of the Patriarch of Moscow, and of his position in the Christian world. What strikes a western observer as expansionism, only too nearly parallel to the expansionism of the Russian State, is to the Russian churchman no more than the assertion of a divine authority inherent in the patriarchal office. We may consider one or two examples of this expansionist tendency.

The oldest of the Uniat Churches of the Roman obedience, that of Ruthenia, has been re-incorporated in the Russian Church, from which it had been separated since 1596. Of the methods by which this result was achieved different observers have written in different terms. There are those who think that they resembled rather too closely those by which the separation was brought about three hundred and fifty years ago.

Negotiations have been going on for a long time, with a view to the restoration of the Russian Orthodox bishoprics in America to the patriarchal fellowship. These have so far proved abortive, since the American bishops are not willing to accept the measure of control regarded as necessary by Moscow, and the Patriarch is unwilling to submit to limitation of his patriarchal powers.

The Patriarch of Moscow had invited the heads of many eastern Churches to a great Orthodox conference to be held in Moscow in October 1947. The issuing of the invitation led to correspondence between the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Patriarch of Moscow, in which the customary rhetoric of eastern Church correspondence scarcely concealed deep-rooted opposition. Constantinople claims that the summoning of synods is a prerogative of its Patriarch alone. Moscow repudiates any intention of departing in any way from the ancient Orthodox canons, yet makes it clear that it cannot regard the position of the patriarchates in the present day as having been settled unchangeably by what were never more than conventions, and those belonging to a day in which Byzantium was the imperial city. Most of the Church leaders of the Greek-speaking Orthodox Churches declined the invitation to Moscow. It has now been announced that the conference has been postponed. It seems that this check has been a disappointment to Russian churchmen. It cannot but be a disappointment to others, as it seems probable that among the subjects discussed, if the conference had been held, would have been the orthodox judgment on Anglican orders, and the Orthodox attitude to the world-movement of the Christian Churches, especially as manifested in the World Council of Churches. But it is not likely that Moscow will accept this as a final rebuff; the attempt to gather the Orthodox Churches round the throne of its Patriarch is likely to be repeated before long.

The attitude of western Churches to this Russian revival tends to be ambiguous. There are those who accept at its face value all the most favourable evidence that comes from Russia, and hail with delight what they regard as one of the greatest renewals of all Christian history. Others

are so disturbed by what they regard as the subservience of the Russian Church to the State that they are profoundly sceptical of there being any religious significance at all in what is taking place. The *tertium quid* stands back from both positions, welcoming every evidence of greater freedom for the practice of religion in Russia, yet at the same time watching with anxiety the success of the Church in apparently reconciling the irreconcilable.

The Russian Church seems to view all western Churches with considerable suspicion. The plain anti-communist declarations of the present Pope damn the Roman Church in Russian eyes as one of the strongest allies of recrudescent fascism. The Anglican Church is allied to a capitalist State, and therefore has no spiritual freedom. The American Churches, which are the strongest supporters of the World Council movement and in the main finance it, are the handmaids of American big business, by which their policies are determined. When the Patriarch of Moscow stated that he had called the pan-Orthodox conference to meet in Moscow, because that was the only Orthodox capital in the world in which the Church was free from political interference, the claim may leave western readers gasping; but there is no reason to suppose that the Patriarch made the claim for any other reason than that he took it for granted that it was true.

Ideally Churches, even those which have a measure of connection with the State, retain their spiritual independence and can frame their policies without regard to political considerations. But it has never been possible to make so neat a division between what is due to Caesar and what is due to God. Those who are concerned with ecclesiastical relationships become aware at every turn that it is impossible to deal with Churches as wholly autonomous entities, without consideration for the political situations in which they find themselves and for the relations with States by which their policies are affected. For good or ill, Russia has become the touchstone for the world. The Russian Church cannot be spoken of abstractly, as though the Russian State had never existed.

Two attitudes towards Russia are so crystal clear as to require no exposition. There are those who accept Russian messianism, and see in it the one hope of the world. There are Christians also who take this view, though perhaps they are not very many. On the other side, there are those who concur with the judgment of the Vatican, regard communism as the source of every evil, and consider Russia to be so inextricably involved in the Marxist system that opposition to everything Russian becomes almost a Christian duty. In this camp are found a great many Christians, not only Roman Catholics, in almost every part of the world.

But enthusiastic acceptance and radical condemnation do not exhaust the possible attitudes. We find some who, while rejecting the Marxist

philosophy, are willing to recognize in communism a force which in many ways has worked and is working for the good of men. There are others who, while remaining faithful to orthodox Christianity, and perhaps still belonging to parties of the right, passionately condemn the traditional attitudes of the Churches in social and political affairs. While the former group would look towards Russia with the hope that experience might prune away excess and enucleate the good from its embarrassing accompaniments, the latter would be disposed rather to regard communism as a judgment let loose by God upon an unfaithful world and an apathetic Church.

In all the problems of relationship between east and west, ecclesiastical and political, a part of great significance has to be played by the countries and Churches of central Europe, and especially by that of Czechoslovakia. The Czechs themselves are very well aware of their own position. Their cultural affinities are mainly with the west, and to these they hold with intense determination. But they are conscious that race and language alike give them access to the Slavonic world such as is denied to the peoples further west. They desire to maintain close relations with all their western friends.

Until a month ago Czech Church life reflected something of the feeling for political independence. The majority of Christians are Roman Catholics. Of the Protestants, many are Lutherans or Reformed. Those Churches, however, which take their origin from their own national reformation in the days of John Huss, and not from the confusions of the sixteenth century, claim to be, more than others, the true interpreters of the national tradition and the inheritors of that stubborn Bohemian nationalism, which made the Bohemians so formidable an element in the medieval world, and kept the Czechs together recognizably as a nation through centuries of political submergence. The leaders of these Churches took a position of independence, which is not to be confused with timid compromise. They are oecumenical in their outlook, and shared intimately in the development of the movement leading up to the Assembly at Amsterdam this year. It is too early to interpret the consequences of the new political alignment of Czechoslovakia for the life of its Churches. The Roman Church has claimed to "stand above politics", which may be interpreted as a claim that to be a good Catholic does not imply being a bad Czech. Some Christian leaders, with strong western sympathies, may well have lost their jobs in the purges. But we should be rash to assume that the new régime will not find supporters and apologists among Christian leaders.

But neither Czechoslovakia, nor the German Churches, divided in two as they are by the lines of zonal division, nor the supporters of the Moscow patriarchate in the Russian *diaspora* in France, can answer the question whether the Russian Church will be represented this year at Amsterdam or not. As matters are moving at the present time, it seems likely that

there will be no official representation, but that Russia may be present in the person of observers. Those attending the Assembly in this capacity will not have the right to speak unless specially called upon to do so ; on the other hand they will be free from any share or responsibility for decisions and pronouncements of the Assembly.

And what, if anything, is this great Assembly of the Churches to say on the most burning issue in the world to-day ? Many people feel that they know the answer to that question. There are those who would like a plain declaration of the evils of communism and of its radically anti-Christian character. This might be so expressed as not to be directed against any one country. It might be formulated as a judgment on philosophical ideas, and not on any existing political system. But any such statement, however safeguarded, would at once be taken as a declaration of hostility to Russia and to all that it stands for in the political world. The World Council of Churches would be stamped as being the organ only of those Churches which stand on this side of the iron curtain, and would be regarded as aligned on the anti-communist front with all those political and religious bodies which have felt it right to adopt a clear attitude of hostility to the communist experiment. The World Council would then lose, for a period to be measured rather in decades than in years, all hope of co-operation with the Churches under Russian influence. Some would be ready at once to discount this loss. Others would feel that the loss would be severely felt on both sides. The Churches beyond the iron curtain need all the help that can be given by more fortunate Churches, as they take up the immense task of repairing the ravages of thirty years. The Orthodox Churches have a wealth of liturgical experience and of devotion, without sharing in which no movement can call itself genuinely oecumenical. The present composition of the World Council is far too western ; this preponderance of the west needs urgently to be balanced by the riches of the eastern traditions.

Another group would like to see the Assembly put forth a declaration in an almost exactly contradictory sense. For this group, capitalism is the hydra-headed monster which is laying waste the life of men. Its supporters are not for the most part communists. They would not ask for any unconditional commendation of the communist system or of the Russian régime. They would be quite willing to recognize the incompatibility of rigid Marxist orthodoxy with Christian faith. Yet they would maintain that the Russian experiment has brought new hope and life to the peoples of the world. Some of the delegates from Asia are likely to say, if it comes to a choice between the imperialism of the so-called Christian nations, or closer association with Russia, that their peoples, including the Christians, may well choose the communist alternative, and that it is unrealistic not to recognize and to record this fact. Others, less politically fixed, may consider that for the Church to adopt a merely negative attitude to Russia is to abandon its prophetic office, and that it must exercise a

task of discriminating judgment.

But, however it is phrased, any statement on the situation which falls short of outright condemnation of communism and all its works is likely to arouse bitter opposition in certain quarters. There are Christian groups in England and America the attitude of which towards communism is that of a holy war, and which regard any sort of compromise as treachery. If the World Council makes any statement which can be construed as giving any sort of countenance to communism and Russian policy, it runs the risk of alienating some of those Churches which from the start have been most deeply engaged in the oecumenical movement, and which have done most to foster it by their gifts.

There remains the possibility of silence. But is this a possibility that can be taken seriously? In a year of crisis, the Churches of the world meet to talk about high themes. Will they declare that on the most living issue in the world to-day, and an issue which cannot be dismissed as merely political and therefore irrelevant to the spiritual task of the Church, they have nothing at all to say? If they do so, they will have done much to justify the onlooker in his judgment that the Churches may have been useful in past times, when men still believed in invisible worlds, but that they are outworn survivals in a day when we have at last learnt to confine our attention to the things that we can see and touch. The greatest Church of all has already declared its mind with no uncertain voice. That which is, at least potentially, the second largest, has taken its stand on the opposite side. Will those other Churches, numbering perhaps two hundred million adherents, which are attached to the World Council find anything to say that the world will find worthy of its attention?

The answer is by no means obvious. The Churches in many countries are expecting a great deal from the Assembly. It is not surprising that those responsible for the preparations for it, look forward with intense interest, not unalloyed by apprehension, to August 22, 1948.

(The author is Assistant Bishop to the Archbishop of Canterbury and is one of the Secretaries of the World Council of Churches.)

RADIOACTIVITY

BY JOHN LANGDON-DAVIES

THE discovery of radium put into the hands of medicine a powerful new tool, for it was soon discovered that cells in living tissue could be altered or destroyed by the fast moving particles shot out of the radium nucleus. But, as a tool, radium proved to be two-edged. Brought into contact with the normal human body, it produced "burns" which ulcerated and frequently became malignant. Aimed at malignant tissue whenever this could be bombarded without endangering the healthy tissue in which the malignancy was embedded, curative effects were possible. Radium soon became the method of choice for combating many forms of cancer. Its chief shortcoming was its scarcity. The world began to see the depressing sight of cancer victims queueing up for the one treatment which gave them hope, a hope which rapidly faded on the face of delay, since malignant disease waits for no man.

In the 'thirties, there came new hope, for it was discovered that by means of certain powerful and costly apparatus, of which the cyclotron is the best known, man could produce artificial radioactive elements. These consisted of atoms with precisely the same chemical nature as those of ordinary elements but in an unstable state of balance. In a given time such atoms recover their balance by shooting out a particle from their nuclei just as natural radium and other radioactive elements do. Thus radiosodium is ordinary sodium except that there is a particle too much in its nucleus. By ridding itself of the extra particle the atom becomes stable once more.

The world supply of radium, probably not more than thirty pounds weight in all, began to be supplemented by these new artifacts. The cyclotron was able to produce many new types of radioactive elements such as radiophosphorus, radiosulphur, and radiocarbon, which not only supplemented radium but suggested altogether new uses.

Radioactivity was no longer regarded merely as a bombarding force to be used for the destruction of cancer and other diseased cells, for scientists very soon saw that it could be used for exploration into the hidden processes going on within the living body. The usefulness of radioactivity for this purpose is great because it can be easily detected and measured with immense accuracy.

By the use of the Geiger counter a single atom disintegrating within the living body can be detected. Explosions are heard as a click or auto-

matically counted by the apparatus placed near the suspected source of radioactivity. By mixing minute quantities of an artificial radioactive element with normal atoms of the same element, it thus became possible to find out where any substance entering the living body went, what the body did with it, and what chemical changes took place in the course of its physiological history.

Thus, if a quantity of ordinary iodine is "tagged" with a few atoms of artificially produced radioactive iodine, the progress of the iodine as a whole through the body could be followed by the clicks set up in a Geiger counter. However, the amount of artificial radioactive atoms which a cyclotron can produce is very limited, and their manufacture very expensive. Nor can many kinds of radioactive elements be made. So although the new tool was fully appreciated by scientists, it could not go into every-day use. But to-day the atomic pile, perfected in a hurry to create the most destructive of man's inventions—the atomic bomb—has completely altered the situation.

As a by-product of its more disreputable activities, the atomic pile produces virtually unlimited quantities of radioactive isotopes, as they are called, of at least sixty different elements. In many cases, more than one kind of radioisotope can be made for each ordinary kind of atom. These radioisotopes have precisely the same chemical qualities as an ordinary atom of the same element and, as well, the quality of emitting radioactivity. The body is unable to distinguish them from normal atoms so that they go through the same changes as any other like substance entering a living body.

One of the most valuable radioisotopes is carbon¹⁴ and the effect of the coming of the atomic pile can be seen by comparing the costs of producing this valuable substance now and a few years ago. A minute quantity of carbon¹⁴ which, made by the cyclotron would cost a million dollars, costs at the moment fifty dollars when the atomic pile is used for its manufacture.

Now it is not at all certain even in the event of a third world war that atomic bombs will be used. There is a growing school of strategic thought which believes that strategic bombing with ordinary bombs was a mistake and that strategic bombing with atomic bombs would be such an egregious mistake that nobody would dream of making it. On the other hand, it is absolutely certain that the use of radioisotopes will completely revolutionize the biological sciences within ten years. It is more than possible that the experiments already in progress with radioisotopes will affect humanity far more profoundly than any bomb.

It is important to emphasize that their first value is for the increase of fundamental knowledge about the processes of life and not directly as a medical tool. Certainly the immediate value of radioisotopes for curative purposes can be exaggerated, but with that warning three examples of their

use in medicine may be given.

When iodine is introduced into a human body, either in the course of normal feeding or for experimental purposes, the thyroid gland takes selective action and within a short time a large percentage of the iodine is concentrated in the gland. One form of thyroid disease can be helped by taking advantage of this fact. Radioactive iodine in quantities which would be dangerous if it were to remain distributed all over the body, can be introduced into the patient with the firm knowledge that it will be accumulated in the gland. Here it will act on the cells causing the disease, and by destroying them, return the gland more or less to its normal functioning. In this case, valuable results can be obtained, thanks to a physiological property of the body, namely, its power to concentrate iodine in one particular organ.

There is one property of any radioactive atom which adds greatly to the practical value of the new tool : of any number of such atoms half will have "decayed", that is, given off their radioactivity and become stable, at the end of a fixed and invariable interval. You cannot tell when any given atom will explode but you can be certain that of X atoms of radioactive iodine¹⁶, $\frac{1}{2}X$ will have exploded in thirteen days, another $\frac{1}{4}X$ in thirteen more days, and so on. Of X atoms of radioactive carbon¹⁴, $\frac{1}{2}X$ will have exploded in ten thousand years, another $\frac{1}{4}X$ in another ten thousand years, and so on. Of X atoms of sodium²², $\frac{1}{2}X$ will have exploded in 87.1 days.

Every radioactive element has a different "half-life" varying from fractions of a second to millions of years and this "half-life" never alters. This means that you know how long it will take for a dose of any given element to become exhausted and by choosing an element with the right length of half-life you can limit the amount and therefore the dangers of radioactivity introduced into a living body. In the example just given, you can introduce radioactive iodine knowing that after a definite interval, the activity will have become negligible. Were this not so it would never be safe to use such a deadly material at all.

A second example shows how radioactive iodine can be used as an indicator rather than as a cure. It is the nature of a cancer, when it has reached a certain stage of development, to send through the lymphatic system or through other channels of the body, colonies of malignant cells which settle down in remote parts of the body, there to start secondary cancers. Radioactive iodine is introduced into the patient and allowed by natural processes to accumulate in the cancerous thyroid gland. When this cancer sends out its colonies of daughter cells, they will take with them radioactive atoms ; and then, if the colonies settle down in remote parts of the body, there to grow into secondary tumours, their presence can be detected by a Geiger counter, or by photographic means, and they can, in fortunate instances, be given surgical attention before it is too late.

The third example concerns the use of the radioisotope of sodium. In

certain diseases of the heart, the patient's tissues become water-logged and the patient dies of a sort of internal drowning. Hitherto, efforts to combat this have taken the form of giving drugs which increase the excretion of water from the body. Now, in the normal course of life, water is passing from the blood stream into the tissues and back again unceasingly and in large quantities—twenty barrels a day being a fairly accurate estimate. This passage of water to and fro through the walls of the blood vessels, is controlled in part by the sodium salts suspended in the body fluids. It has been estimated that fifty pounds of sodium chloride pass in and out of the blood vessels every twenty-four hours.

It was resolved to discover the whereabouts of the sodium chloride by tagging the sodium with a radioisotope. By counting the radioactivity in the tissues of healthy people and oedematous (that is "water-logged") people, it was shown that thirteen per cent. of the sodium returned from the tissues into the blood every minute in normal people, and only seven per cent. in diseased people. Thus a far larger proportion of sodium chloride was remaining in their tissues, and the water followed the sodium chloride. However much water was persuaded to leave the body by diuretic drugs more would enter the tissues so long as excess sodium chloride remained in them. This meant that a rational way of combating the disease must include the means not merely of eliminating the water from the tissues but the sodium salts also. In short, by finding out what happened to a chemical within the body, a means of securing healthy physiological action which otherwise could not have been devised becomes possible.

This last is an example of the kind of research which will occupy scientists for some years to come. There is no process in physiology which cannot now be studied more effectively, thanks to radioisotopes. The body has become transparent, and every chemical element, every organic compound, every nutritional substance, can be seen going about its business, thanks to the signals they can all be made to emit. Thus, red blood corpuscles have been tagged with radiophosphorus, and followed in their course throughout the circulatory system. This has already thrown light on the type of heart disease in which the heart muscle itself becomes starved of blood through the damming up of the vessel supplying it with blood. It was known that in such conditions, the heart could bring into use alternative channels for blood supply, but the actual process was a mystery. The tagged red corpuscles have now been followed in their course through this emergency system and the whole problem elucidated.

Again, in order to be able to cure anaemia it is first necessary to understand what governs the rate of manufacture of blood cells in the bone marrow. By introducing the radioisotope of iron into the body and later examining the blood corpuscles, their date of birth from the parent bone marrow can be estimated. A smear of blood can be placed on a slide, a

photographic plate put in contact with it and on developing the plate the amount of radioactivity can be seen and an estimate can easily be made of the proportion of the cells which have come into existence since the radioactive iron entered the body.

Hitherto, most of the problems of "intermediate metabolism" have been insoluble mysteries. Human life consists of chemical changes. Chemical elements enter the body and are built up into compounds; or compounds are broken down into simpler substances. These are finally either built into the body tissues or excreted as waste. But the process is by no means simple. The body cannot always change its food into what it wants in one single step. The raw material is made into some new compound which in turn is changed into a third substance which the body can use. Often there are many such steps before the body can use what it assimilates in the form of food from the outside world.

The understanding of health and disease depends very largely upon knowing how these intermediate steps take place. It is possible to isolate and study the intermediate products of metabolism but hitherto usually only by methods which involve the death of the animal and therefore interference with the normal chemical processes.

By introducing tagged elements into various compounds we can follow the way in which the body breaks these compounds down and turns them into other compounds which it can use for building up its tissues. Or we can use tagged elements to find out from what source the body draws its supply for building up the compounds it requires. We are in a position to elucidate complicated processes which until now have had to be taken on trust and therefore we are the more likely to be able to find remedies when these processes go wrong.

A simple example can be taken from research into plant behaviour. The plant physiologist can tell us how the plant is able to use the sun's energy for building up carbon and oxygen and hydrogen into sugar, starch and other carbo-hydrates. He has been able to make various more or less accurate guesses as to the course taken by the plant foods through the tissues of the plant, but now he can go many steps further. He can make carbon dioxide with a certain amount of radioactive carbon included in the molecule. If he then feeds this to a plant growing in full sunlight or, let us say, an hour, and allows the plant to grow for a few days more, he can now tell precisely what the plant has been able to do in the course of those days with the meal of carbon dioxide absorbed in that hour. If for example the plant is a sugar cane, he can find out in precisely what parts of the plant any sugar manufactured by it out of carbon dioxide during that hour has been deposited, for the molecules of sugar will contain a proportion of radiocarbon whose presence will be revealed either photographically or by a Geiger counter. In an experiment in Honolulu, where tagged carbon dioxide was given to the leaf of a large

cane plant for an hour, the radiosugar was found three days afterwards chiefly in the growing tip, the roots and the youngest leaf of the plant. But even the oldest shoots were slightly radioactive.

In the same way, by using radioiron the cause of the commercially important disease of plant chlorosis has been elucidated. Soil conditions lead to the accumulation of phosphorus on the surface of the roots ; this acts as a barrier to the iron in the soil. Insufficient iron reaches the leaves so that chlorophyll cannot be synthesized and the plant cannot properly use the sun's energy. Thus, innumerable mysteries surrounding the way in which animal and plant life use their food for the building up of their tissues and for the carrying on of their life processes, can one by one be made visible to human sense.

The best text-books of physiology abound in such phrases as "so-and-so thought to be", "it is believed that", "what happens to so-and-so within the body is unknown." To-day all over the world physiologists working with small packets of radioisotopes shipped from American piles and from the British pile at Harwell are attacking these patches of ignorance.

In one place, agriculturists are tagging fertilizers and watching with Geiger counters their passage through plants. Minute quantities of minerals known to be required to keep plants in health are fed in radioactive form and when, later, the fruit is sliced and laid against a photographic plate, the infinitesimal quantities are found to have ended up in the seed or the skin or in some other special organ, as the case may be.

Hitherto, we have only known that in the right cases it is a good thing to inject penicillin into the ailing human body. Crystalline penicillin can now be tagged with radiosulphur and its progress traced through the body. We can see if it combines with other substances and if so, how.

Even more remarkable is that bacteria can be induced to feed on radio-phosphorus and to become self-signallers of their own presence. We know that many healing drugs act by competing with bacteria for chemicals essential for the bacteria's food. By tagging suspected chemicals we can find out what the bacteria eat for they too will become radioactive if they consume any of our tagged material. Tuberculosis is one of the important diseases being studied in this way.

Sex hormones and others are also being tagged and it is hard to over-estimate the importance of the possible results of these experiments, since it is generally agreed that the health and right organization of the living body depends on the balanced working of the endocrine glands which produce hormones often in minute quantities. By tagging the products of these glands in turn it will be possible to watch the part played by the pituitary, the adrenals, the gonads and the rest.

The extraordinary accuracy of the new tool may be illustrated by the experiments which are being carried out concerning the part played by manganese in the living body. It has long been known that a minute

trace of manganese is necessary for healthy life, but why, or where the manganese goes in a living body, seemed altogether beyond human ingenuity to discover. By tagging it with radioactive atoms it is possible to find what is done by a rat with a dose of one thousandth part of a milligram of manganese. Three days after this speck has been eaten by the rat, most of it turns up in the liver. If, however, it is injected into the rat with a hypodermic needle, the chief concentration is found in the skin and bone. Why this should be is a matter for further research, and it does not concern us here, but the example will serve to show the extreme accuracy with which the new tool can be used.

Another example of this astonishing accuracy comes from quite a different branch of science. Engineers are vitally concerned with problems of friction. Wherever there are moving parts, there is bound to be wear and tear, and this must be reduced as far as possible. Hitherto nobody has known much about what happens to the minute pieces of metal detached from the machine parts as a result of friction. It is now possible to irradiate a piece of steel in an atomic pile so that some of its surface molecules will be radioactive. These can be used for friction experiments in which some of the molecules will be rubbed off. Their new whereabouts can then be traced with a Geiger counter or a photographic plate, and it is found that a certain amount of metal is transferred to the other surface which has been rubbing against the radioactive steel. So accurate is this method that it is possible to detect as little as one ten-thousand-millionth of an ounce of metal.

Various applications of radioisotopes in oil boring are also reported from America. For example, in a very deep oil boring, water bearing strata may be encountered and in order to continue the operation satisfactorily these have to be sealed off by squeezing in cement. By incorporating radioisotopes into the cement, the position of these leaky strata can at any later time be verified simply by lowering an instrument which will detect radioactivity. In this way a complete vertical map of the strata can be obtained. Furthermore, various geological formations absorb the radioisotopes with different intensities. It becomes possible therefore to find out what strata are lying hundreds of feet under the ground simply by using radioactive tracer material. Thus, the tool which makes the human body transparent also enables the oil engineer to see the structure of the earth hundreds of feet down an experimental bore hole.

It is not much more than a year since parcels of radioisotopes began to be distributed from the Clinton laboratories and in that time nearly two hundred separate groups of research workers have received about one hundred varieties of man-made radioactive atoms. Every one of these parcels is being used to solve the enigmas of science; not only is a tool of the utmost importance thus being distributed but, unfortunately, a source of very grave danger also. Every radioactive parcel, however

small, can destroy its user unless the proper controls are observed. Everybody handling the material, either at the laboratories from which it is distributed or in the course of research, has to wear a badge containing suitable photographic film, and this film has to be developed at regular intervals. On the film will be found an accurate measurement of the amount of radiation which has escaped into the scientist's own body and if danger level has been reached immediate remedial action must be taken.

The importance of devising an adequate technique of protection before radioactivity comes into still greater use will be realized directly the significance of one effect of radioactivity is fully appreciated. It could become a danger not merely to the people who use it but to the human race as a whole. Not only can it set up incurable diseases in the body which comes into contact with it, but it can produce mutations in the ova or spermatozoa carried by that body.

The bombs dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki destroyed many thousands by radiosickness but they had hidden effects also which may become apparent in the Japanese population hundreds of years hence. A single exploding radioactive atom may alter a gene in a human chromosome thereby altering some human characteristic in an unborn child which will inherit that altered chromosome. Such mutations are almost always deleterious. A mutation affecting intellectual qualities is almost certain to produce idiocy rather than genius. The effect of these mutations does not become immediately apparent because they are almost always recessive in character, that is to say, that to make their effect apparent in a child, the child has to inherit the same defective gene from both of its parents.

If these facts are considered, two consequences vital to the human race can be seen. First, there is no such thing as a dose or quantity of radioactivity which can be regarded as harmless. We cannot say that so long as the amount absorbed by people is kept below a certain quantity there is no danger to the race, although there is a maximum which can be regarded as harmless to the actual individual concerned. Secondly, it is a matter of statistical calculation to determine the likelihood of a man and woman having the same lethal gene mating and producing a defective child. The larger the proportion of a given inter-marrying population to be subjected to radioactivity the sooner will this occur. It can be shown that if a certain proportion run the risk, then defective offspring may be expected in a given population after ten, twenty or thirty generations. It may not seem very important that in four or five hundred years sub-human Japanese will begin to be born as a result of Hiroshima, but if we are about to enter an epoch of universal application of radioactivity, the problem becomes one of life or death for the human race as a whole.

It seems as if once more humanity can only eat of the tree of knowledge at its own peril. Good and evil are combined in all its fruit.

CO-OWNERSHIP IN INDUSTRY

BY WALTER JAMES

BEFORE the factory system, in a great part of England, the worker stood on his own feet as a master manufacturer ; after it, he found himself a hired hand in somebody else's mill. That is the fact of chief significance about the Industrial Revolution. For instance, in 1806 :

In the domestic system, which is that of Yorkshire, the manufacture is conducted by a multitude of master manufacturers, generally possessing a very small and scarcely any amount of capital. They buy the wool of the dealer and, in their own houses, assisted by their wives and children, and from two or three to six or seven journeymen, they dye it, when dyeing is necessary, and through all the different stages work it up into undressed cloth. (" Report from the Select Committee on Woollen Manufacture ". P. 1.)

As Professor Paul Mantoux has pointed out, the journeymen served only as a reserve from which the class of small manufacturers was recruited. These small owners were yeomen of industry. They worked as operatives work to-day, but were independent, responsible and proud.

It is not necessary here to describe how economic forces changed these many masters, not without bitter protest, into the hands of a few great employers. But Mr. J. A. Waites, of Manchester University, in his paper on " The Attitude of Adults towards Property in a Lancashire Urban Area " (*British Journal of Psychology*. Vol. XXXVI), has given in his account of the village of Stubbins a history which symbolizes the whole disastrous division of industry into two camps—owners with their managers, and workers. When the mills first went up in Stubbins they were small, and masters and men worked in them side by side. The spirit of domestic manufacture remained a little while ; the workers still spoke of the mill as " ours ", not " his ". As time went on the masters became richer ; they no longer worked beside their men ; they began to live in finer style. It was becoming harder for the worker to think of the mill as " ours ", when, one day in 1842, the workers of Stubbins struck for better conditions and the masters called in the dragoons to send them back to the looms. That action killed the workers' use of the happy pronoun of possession. As Mr. Waites points out, their industrial experience changed their morality. Stealing something from the mill caused them little conflict of conscience. The mill had become something in which they had no stake or care, something in alien hands. The history of Stubbins is the history of industrial England. It is a history of how ownership in the sphere of work, through a change in economic organization, passed from the many to the few.

That this deprivation should be seen first and foremost as an affront

to human dignity, only tolerable when man's true nature had been forgotten, is the standpoint of a policy resolution which will be laid before the Liberal Party Assembly at Blackpool this month. It is based on the belief that, while man has a need of ownership in many things, he has a natural right to ownership in the product of his mind and hands, in the tools he uses, and in his place of work. The implication of this declaration of "natural right" is important. It implies the acceptance of a particular philosophy of man, which maintains that ownership is natural to him, that is, he cannot live his full life without it. This is the philosophy of Aristotle, Aquinas and Locke. Man works on material and on this material (which he "hath mixed his labour with," as Locke put it) leaves the mark of his own personality, something of himself, something that is characteristically "his". Master of himself, man is also master of what he has made. Further, tools are the agents between the maker and the thing made. If the worker lacks some degree of property in the tools he uses he cannot be said to possess independence. His power to use his skill is at the mercy of some other, who possesses the only means by which the workers' skill may be translated into action.

Now ownership, according to this position, is not something desirable, but necessary. Without it, a man's will to freedom and responsibility is seriously reduced.

Any system that subjects man to permanent loss, by denying the needs of his nature, must of necessity be filled with discord. The industrial system is no exception. Man did not lightly surrender the dignity with which he was endowed, of which his right to ownership was part, and the workers' struggle against the dehumanizing trends of economic organization led to the formation and hardening of the "two nations". The ill feeling between employers and men which marked the nineteenth century has no parallel in history until one goes back to the fall of Rome, and finds the slaves deserting their humane and civilized masters for the barbarians.

Underlying the profound resentment of men against their masters which grew up in the last century was their deprivation of all share of ownership in industry. It may be objected that the workers did not quote Aristotle and Locke or appeal to any doctrine of natural rights. Through their dream of liberation there stalked nevertheless the phantom of ownership. It is a remarkable fact that immediately the working classes organized themselves politically and became articulate their first demand, which has been continued until this day, was for the industrial ownership that had been snatched away from them. How else may the doctrine of Socialism be taken? From its beginning it has been tied up with a theory of ownership. That the ownership offered by the Socialists was indeed a phantom, a rhetorician's fancy, without solid advantage of any sort, is now in process of being discovered. Socialism has failed because public ownership in industry in no way changes the status of the worker. Further, ownership through the State is impersonal; it is a

legal and constitutional abstraction which the ordinary man's mind can neither understand nor enjoy.

Thus the restoration of ownership in industry to the worker still remains to be accomplished. In their attempt to devise a policy that may succeed, a group of Liberals under the chairmanship of Mr. Elliott Dodds, the party's president-elect, drew up the Blackpool resolution. There is in it no looking back, even of the robust Chestertonian sort, and no hankering after the years before the factory economy. There is no wish to write down the triumphs of the industrial system and fly away to some dream world where reigns the quietude of the domestic manufacture. All these things are impossible, and the restoration of ownership does not demand the impossible. A principle must be maintained, but its application will vary from age to age. Ownership in his work was realized by the worker of the eighteenth century, and not by the worker of to-day, but this does not mean that we must return to the forms of ownership current in the eighteenth century. The principle of ownership must be restored—for those who take a certain view of man this is more a duty than a political policy—but the mode in which this principle is practically expressed must be suited to industry as it now is.

Personal or family ownership as a generalized solution throughout industry is plainly out of the question. In a concern employing a thousand or more men and women ownership must be on an associational basis, and, in place of the capital investors who now monopolize ownership, it is necessary to establish a new owning group made up of three sections—labour, management and capital investors. The proposals to this end are as follows :

A Liberal Government will accordingly introduce legislation requiring every industrial concern with a capital of not less than £50,000 and/or not less than fifty employees to submit, within a stipulated period, for approval by a specially constituted Commission, a scheme embodying certain fundamental principles. In the event, however, of a concern being able to prove, to the satisfaction of the Commission, that it is impracticable to establish such a scheme, then it will receive a certificate of exemption.

These principles are :—

1. Employees to be paid at least the Trade Union or Trade Board wages applicable to the particular trade, including any negotiated bonuses or additions.
2. After due provision has been made for reserves and other proper purposes, including the payment of preference share dividends and a non-cumulative return at the gilt-edged rate on ordinary share capital, the surplus profits to be apportioned between those actively engaged in the concern (according to their earnings and length of service) and the ordinary share-holders.
3. Opportunity to be given, where desired by the employees, for employee share-holding.
4. All persons actively engaged in the business to be entitled to elected representation on the Board of Directors, where such exists, and consultative machinery to be operative at all levels.

In the case of nationally-owned industries or services a Liberal Government will, wherever feasible, adopt a policy of decentralization, beginning with the coal-mining industry, where remoteness of control has already been the cause of unnecessary

friction and ill-feeling. Legislation will be introduced to enable groups of mines to be managed with the largest possible degree of local autonomy, on a basis which provides for the sharing of " efficiency-profit " among the employees and representation on the boards of management.

Summed up, it is a policy for compulsory profit-sharing, with workers' representation on all boards. Thus it satisfies two essential requirements of real ownership ; it allows the worker to get something out of what he owns and have some say in its control. Shared profits, shared control is the nearest we can get to this in industry.

It is necessary to emphasize again the reason why this policy is being put forward. It is not chiefly to catch votes, though Liberals hope that votes will be caught. It is not chiefly as an industrial incentive, though it is expected to serve as one. The demand for the right to ownership (and the share in control it gives is far more important than the share in profits) is put forward on the same sort of grounds as the right to vote in earlier days. The idea of man's natural right to ownership, and to democratic government, spring from the same tree. Democracy accords man a say in whatever concerns himself, even indirectly. It is surely absurd to grant him this right in national affairs, where its misuse can give rise to extreme danger, and not in factory affairs, where at the worst its misuse can do no more than drive one concern out of business. All the arguments against the workers sharing control in industry are arguments against universal suffrage. A worker does know something at least about his factory, while about foreign affairs, as the cynic suggests, he often knows nothing at all.

This being said, it may at once be granted that a share in control of a factory sets its work-people no more in complete command than the right to vote allows an electorate to behave as a government. It is true that the people are politically sovereign, but it is also true that the people are willing to let themselves be governed by a small specialist body, who are skilled not only in the high knowledge of government but also in handling the people, their masters. The Government and Parliament generally (here is the virtue of representation rather than delegation) have not to bother about every changing current of public feeling and excitement. They can hold a settled course and wait until reason prevails. This satisfactory result is attained by the admirable complexities of our Constitution which, as the creation of a long line of men who believed in original sin, hedges every right with safeguards, usually of a delaying character, against its misuse. Thus to suppose, as some will certainly do, that workers' directors will lead to workers' control in industry, with the chaotic consequences that attended such experiments in the early days of the Russian Revolution, is as unfounded as Shaftesbury's nineteenth century delusion that democracy must inevitably mean mob rule.

It is a right, then, that this policy seeks to restore. It is a policy of moral purpose first and foremost. Yet there are strong secondary arguments in its favour that, through its restoration of a natural right and

its overthrow of the inhuman and artificial industrial relations which are the legacy of the early 1800's, there will be created an altogether better atmosphere inside the nation's mills and factories. Profit-sharing by itself is not a particularly good incentive to increased production, but, when it is used to express the whole idea of ownership and is wedded to a share in control, it stands for a change in the character of industrial relations which is bound to have an excellent influence over production. By far the greatest slackener of production is bad human relations, or, to use Disraeli's phrase again, the continued rule of the "two nations". Treat management, workers and capital as equal in dignity and rights and the first step has been taken to their showing the united efforts of a team out to win.

There is, of course, a sufferer by this new arrangement—the passive investor of capital. The position and rewards of managers and operatives, and indeed of owner-managers—all people actively engaged in the concern—are usually improved, and never reduced, under the scheme. The manager and owner-manager will receive much the same as before. They will have, however, certain new problems in the sphere of personal relations. It will no longer be enough for them to know how to organize production; they will be required to lead men. The history of the wartime joint production committees proved one thing—that this sort of consultation succeeds only where managers are up to their job. No aspect of management is more important than that of knowing how to handle men, and the co-ownership scheme only makes it more important still.

It will not surely be taken amiss, after these general remarks, for a Liberal to suggest why he thinks this policy will be of advantage to his party. For a long time Liberals have had no distinctive policy of their own, and their sensible and moderate researches have been regularly used by the two larger parties. Liberals are used to arguing among themselves, the one saying: "We have no policy" and the other replying: "We have too much policy." Both are right. Liberals have plenty of sensible suggestions to make in every field, but no distinctive policy with which their party is identified in the public mind. Such a policy is their only sure means of reviving themselves; they will get nowhere by manoeuvring, or talking at large about freedom and responsibility. Co-ownership is a distinctive, practical policy, and it flows from a traditional philosophy of man to which most Liberals subscribe. It is a moral policy with an "ought" about it. At the same time it is not a policy that other parties are likely to borrow. There was no copyright in the Beveridge policies for Social Security and Full Employment on which the Liberals fought the 1945 election. They were statements of the most enlightened thinking in their respective fields, and the enlightened in all parties could support them. Everything in Labour party history, however, makes it unlikely that its members would even wish to borrow Liberal ideas of co-ownership. Earlier in the century there would have been much in it to

attract the syndicalists ; nowadays the Labour party is committed to State socialism and sweeps away the famous co-partnerships of the gas industry in its nationalization bill.

Although Conservatives have talked much about profit-sharing and co-partnership, they are not competitors. In fact, the Liberal policy will steal all the thunder from the *Industrial Charter*. It is, of course, almost impossible for a party whose core of strength is the great employers to have a bold co-ownership policy. It is rare indeed for any class of men to espouse a policy which goes even to a small extent against their interests. Here lies the reason for the vagueness of the Conservatives' *Industrial Charter*, which is going to render it worthless as ammunition in the next general election. The Liberals will have a scheme for co-ownership throughout industry which will be enforced under law. The Tories, held back by the great employers, have no more than a scheme for propaganda on behalf of co-ownership. It was put as clearly as could be wanted in Mr. R. A. Butler's article in the February 1948 issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY : " Our proposal is that the Government should lay down a code of good practice in these matters. We should seek the approval of Parliament for this code and endeavour to mobilize in its favour the powerful pressure of public opinion."

The inability of either the Conservative or the Labour party to settle the divisions of industry is caused by their fatal commitments to the two sides. The Conservative party cannot have a national policy for industry, in spite of the good will of some of its members, because the main strength of the party springs from one section of the nation, the great employers. The Labour party in its turn is ham-strung by the T.U.C. connection. Liberals are fortunately free of commitments to interests ; they are honest brokers if any are to be found. If they have the courage to accept at their next Assembly a policy which, though radical, has evolved from *Britain's Industrial Future*, they will cause considerable embarrassment to their two main opponents and greatly advantage themselves. Co-ownership is a policy which, put out the right way, could win back the working man's vote. Obviously the Conservatives think so, but they themselves can offer words only, not action. Labour, on the other hand, will be left defending the blessings of public ownership—an ever more hopeless task once Labour voters gain experience of working in public concerns and of seeing their unions tie up with the new boss.

AUSTRALIAN PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

By W. FRIEDMANN

AT present hundreds of thousands of British and other Europeans, obsessed by the fear that hangs over Europe and the deep economic crisis which shakes Britain, look to Australia as a land of hope and prospects. At the same time, politicians and strategists think of Australia as a secondary centre of Empire, as a country destined by its relatively secure situation and its potentialities for development to assume a far greater share in imperial and international responsibilities. In such circumstances it is only too easy to substitute vague hopes and aspirations for sober thinking. It is therefore particularly welcome that some recent books illuminate some salient aspects of Australia's life, development, resources and problems.* By a happy coincidence the three books under review deal with the three major problems of Australia's future: her economic resources and potentialities, her constitutional and governmental problems conditioned by her federal structure, and her international position, particularly in relation to the United States on the one side and Great Britain on the other.

The collection of essays on the resources and development of Australia, edited by the Professor of Commerce in the University of Melbourne, gives a sober scientific and well-documented appraisal of the economic potentialities of Australia by leading practical and theoretical experts. The greatest merit of the book is that it serves to correct vague talking about the vast empty spaces of Australia. There is a widespread impression among Europeans that here is a continent which only waits for energy, enterprise and the removal of restrictions to enable the development of vast spaces hitherto neglected and uncultivated.

In his introduction, Professor Wood points out the magnitude of the Australian achievement in little more than a century:

In many ways Australia is the Cinderella of the continents—the youngest in point of European contact and settlement, the most isolated by geography, the most refractory in natural resources, the least attractive judged by resemblance to many countries of Europe or North America. The conditions of early settlement were no such as to endear the new homeland to immigrants, or to provide the human basi

* *Australia: Its Resources and Development.* Edited by G. L. Wood, Professor of Commerce in the University of Melbourne. Macmillan. 20s.

The Future of Australian Federalism. By Gordon Greenwood, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Sydney. Oxford University Press. 17s. 6d.

American-Australian Relations. By Werner Levi, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. Oxford University Press. 16s.

upon which a promising extension of European civilization might be built. It would, indeed, in 1800 A.D. have been hard to imagine a less congenial nursery, or a less suitable field for the transplanting of English life and ideas.

The first great phase of Australian development was made possible by two great experiments. The introduction of the merino sheep by MacArthur made Australia the world's greatest wool producer, and wool is still to a large and probably dangerous extent the basis of her prosperity. Farrer's experiments in wheat breeding, coupled with the introduction of fertilizers and later of large-scale mechanized farming, made possible the development of vast grain-growing areas whose productivity is to-day a matter of life and death for Britain. But as the distinguished scientific and agricultural experts, who in the same book discuss the soils of Australia, her pasture and fodder resources, her vast agricultural and forest industries and the economics of farming, point out, the limit of Australia's agricultural development was on the whole reached at the end of the last century, and in some ways pushed beyond the limits of reason and efficiency. Australia's agricultural possibilities are above all limited by the distribution of rain-fall. Heavy rain-fall lowers the reserves of plant nutrients in the soil: on the other hand, an almost complete absence of rain in nearly three-quarters of the continent, makes agriculture impossible. The agriculturally productive belt of Australia is situated in an area between the arid central desert and the coast, which has the heaviest rain-fall. Much has been done to improve natural fertility, in particular by the addition of super-phosphates and the sowing of subterranean clover. But no country is so exposed to the alternatives of abundance and disaster dependent on rain-fall as Australia, and in order to find compensation for poor yields large-scale farmers have sometimes gone into areas which it is utterly uneconomical to cultivate. It appears that only in a few fields, such as the cattle industry, a substantial quantitative increase is still possible, and this is above all dependent on international market conditions.

It may well be that Britain's dollar shortage will compel her to abandon the high-class Argentine beef and to content herself with the less high grade Australian cattle. This is one of the many aspects of the economic-political reorientation caused by Europe's, and in particular Britain's, economic crisis. This might lead to a further development of certain parts of Australia's agricultural economy. But Australia's demands for additional agricultural man-power will in any case be small. The nature of the country demands not small scale mixed farming, but mechanized farming over vast areas or the managing of vast herds of sheep and cattle by a few men helped by mechanized farm equipment. This explains the smallness of Australia's agricultural population in relation to her city population (two fifths of her people live in the three biggest towns), and also explains the present encouragement of the immigration of tradesmen, engineers, builders, scientists, rather than farmers or agricultural labourers.

Australia is in fact still in the middle of the second great phase of her development, dominated by the growth of industry. The progress already made is astounding. It was stimulated first by the discovery of vast mineral resources, and secondly by the incidence of two major wars which forced Australia to rely on her own manufacturing skill rather than on imports. Australia is rich in some of the essential industrial raw materials. In 1929 the probable black coal resources of Australia were estimated at over ten milliard tons, the brown coal resources at nearly four times that quantity. On the other hand no substantial oil deposits have been discovered despite assiduous research, and the hydro-electric sources of power are relatively insignificant except in Tasmania. Australia is the world's fifth producer of gold, but economically more important from the long-term point of view is probably her production of lead and zinc (roughly one-seventh of world production) and of iron ore, the production of which amounted to 2,570,000 tons in 1939 but could be substantially expanded. It is against the background of these natural resources that Australia's secondary industries have made astounding progress, especially during the two world wars. The number of employees in factories between 1938 and February 1944 increased from 565,000 to 837,000. How much further this development will go will largely depend on the development of the international economic and political situation. While the leading industrial producers of the world, such as the United States, Great Britain and, before the war, Germany, still possess superiority of industrial experience and craftsmanship, the gap is rapidly diminishing. The last war has been a great challenge to Australian ingenuity and resourcefulness. In the course of it thousands of new engineers, scientists and tradesmen have been trained. The trend towards greater industrial self-sufficiency will undoubtedly continue. At present it is stimulated by the desperate world shortage of manufactured goods. Moreover Australia has for many years pursued a tariff policy designed to shelter her growing secondary industries, but Great Britain is still Australia's greatest purchaser of agricultural produce, and other countries, such as the United States, are very substantial, though erratic, purchasers of Australian wool. Quite apart from her continued dependence on many industrial products, especially in the heavy industries, Australia cannot therefore neglect the two-way trade with some of the leading industrial countries of the world. This may be reinforced by political and strategic considerations which may make Australia an important partner in an Empire economy.

Australia's industrial development is marked by one factor which creates perhaps her biggest political and psychological problem. Almost the entire incidence of industrial raw materials and of industrial development is concentrated in two of the six Australian states. New South Wales and Victoria between them in 1942 were responsible for nearly

eighty per cent. of the value of Australia's production. As these two states also have, in Sydney and Melbourne, the two major cities containing over one-third of the total population of Australia, and also her two major harbours, they have for many years—with Queensland as a rich agricultural producer as a minor associate—been the "have" states of the Australian federation confronted by the three "have nots", South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania.*

This leads to the second great Australian problem, which is illuminated by Mr. Greenwood's interesting and suggestive study: the future of Australian federalism. The association of six states with a combined population of no more than $7\frac{1}{2}$ million, in a federal system which causes the most complex problems of political economic and social government, dominates Australian life to an extent which people living in a unitary State like Great Britain can hardly appreciate. Australia achieved federation in 1900. Contrary to the usual pattern it was not defensive but economic considerations which supplied the main stimulus. But they were not urgent enough to overcome to more than a limited extent the particularism and the divergencies between six states which had grown up separately and under different conditions and whose centres were separated from each other by many hundreds or even thousands of miles.

The United States Constitution supplied the model for Australia's federal constitution. It was natural that Australia should look to the United States for precedent, as the most recent example of federation achieved by a former British colony. Moreover, American-Australian relations, whilst sporadic, have been persistently friendly. But it was unfortunate that a constitution framed more than a century earlier supplied the model at a time when the problems of industry, communications, and as well as strategy, had changed beyond recognition. The Australian Constitution follows the American pattern of specifically enumerated powers for the federation with reserve powers left to the states, while in a number of subject matters there is concurrent legislative power—that is to say, the states remain competent to deal with them until the federation decides to take charge. Exclusive federal competence is confined to defence, external affairs, taxation and customs. The undoubted extension of Commonwealth functions which has taken place under the pressure of wartime conditions is due to the existence of these powers and an interpretation probably not foreseen by the founders of the Constitution. Until the last war the Commonwealth had hesitated to exercise its responsibility in the field of income tax. It had been content with the revenue from customs, although in 1927 a vital advance towards Commonwealth supremacy was made by an amendment of the Constitution which sanctioned the taking over by the Commonwealth of the public debts of the states and the establishment of an Australian Loan Council responsible for

* Of these South Australia may be on the way towards becoming a "have" state owing in particular to her iron ore deposits.

future loans to the states by the Commonwealth. A more decisive advance came when, in 1942, the High Court declared constitutional a wartime Act by which the Commonwealth assumed complete priority in the whole field of income tax, thus leaving a purely theoretical residue to the states. The assumption of this power was legally justified by the competence of the Commonwealth in matters of taxation.

Other important controls which still prevail, such as a comprehensive and effective price control and rationing system, are based on the Commonwealth's defence power. In the latter field, however, a temporary promulgation of the Commonwealth's defence powers will soon expire and a referendum on the maintenance of price control powers in the hands of the Commonwealth will decide whether what started as a war emergency will, as in so many other countries, become a main permanent pillar of a controlled economy.

In most other fields the distribution of competences as between the Commonwealth and the states has been the source of endless conflicts, uncertainties and ambiguities. Outstanding in importance have been s.51(i) by which the Commonwealth Parliament was empowered to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to trade and commerce with other countries and among the states, and s.51(xxxv) by which it acquired competence for "conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state." Both clauses are unfortunate because modern commerce as well as modern industrial relations do not correspond to the boundaries of states established under very different conditions. Countless decisions have attempted to fix the borderline between trade laws or industrial disputes affecting only one state and those extending beyond the borders. How futile the distinction is is shown by the existence of federal trade unions. In order to make the matter one of Commonwealth concern industrial disputes originating in one state have often been deliberately extended to other states.

Another ambiguity arises from the provision in s.92 of the Constitution that "trade commerce and intercourse among the states . . . shall be absolutely free." Does this mean freedom from all regulation, such as licensing and marketing provisions, or does it merely mean the abolition of economic frontiers between the states but without prejudice to such general regulations as changing economic and social conditions make necessary? These apparently technical formulas cover deep political and social issues between planning and *laissez-faire*, individualism and collectivism, local and national loyalties.

In Australia as in the United States the highest law court of the country is the ultimate arbiter. It has faced the same dilemma, how to preserve judicial impartiality and unpolitical prejudice in the interpretation of a fundamentally political document. The problem is probably insoluble. Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the High Court of

Australia has solved it despite the eminence of their members and the quality of their judgments. They have vacillated between conservative and progressive interpretations, between the logical and a sociological approach. Coupled with the changing composition of the courts, the result has been confusion and, in the case of the High Court of Australia an increasing exposure to political attacks. At the time of writing, the most important political issue in Australia is the introduction of a Bill for the nationalization of banking by the Commonwealth Labour Government, after an Act giving limited powers to the Commonwealth over the conduct of banking by the states which had been declared unconstitutional by the High Court. The debate was marked by strong attacks on the High Court as an instrument of political reaction, and equally heated counter-attacks. These and many other problems, such as the fantastic diversity of railway gauges which are the preserve of the states, lead Mr. Greenwood to the conclusion that federalism as an institution of government is out of date and for the sake of the further progress of Australia must be replaced by a unitary system in which an increasingly artificial division of competence between a sovereign centre and equally sovereign member states is replaced by far reaching administrative devolution from the centre to the individual units. In his contribution to *Australia: Its Resources and Development* Sir Robert Garran, former Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, comes to similar conclusions.

It is, in fact, an inescapable consequence of political and social development that no modern State, whether conservative, liberal or socialistic in philosophy, can do without a large degree of economic and social control. Federal states, by their very rigidity—amendments to the Australian Constitution require not only an absolute majority in both Houses of the Federal Parliament but an approval, through referendum, by a majority of electors and by separate majorities in the majorities of the states—and by the obsolescence of the principles embodied in most of the existing federal constitutions are incapable of securing the necessary minimum controls. It is only in a system where the strong and ruthless control, by one party compels a member state to fall into line, as in Soviet Russia that effective planning is compatible with a federal structure. It may well be that the importance of federalism in our generation lies in its suitability for international associations and states, but that it has outlived its usefulness inside the existing states.

The third outstanding feature in Australia's position, which is illustrated by Mr. Levi's study on the history of *American-Australian Relations*, is her geographical and mental isolation from the storm centres of international affairs. Twice within a generation Australia has taken an active and heroic part in international struggles. In both world wars Australia's contribution, in fighting forces, financial burdens, industrial effort, has been extraordinary in proportion to her population and resources. The last war has also brought considerable numbers of young Australians

serving overseas in direct contact with other countries' peoples and problems. Yet it is no more than a handful of Australians who take an active interest in international affairs. There is a growing awareness of the long-term threat to Australia from the pressure of the immense increasing Asiatic masses in proportion to her own thin and scattered population. For a brief moment, in 1942, the threat of Japanese invasion, averted at the very last moment, showed to everyone the inevitable implication of Australia in international developments. The threat passed as by a miracle, and at the moment the internal weaknesses of China, Japan and India make the problem less immediately acute. The threat was too sudden and the danger has passed too easily to produce as yet a fundamental change and attitude.

The overwhelming pre-occupation of Australians is with their own affairs. Australian developments have been decisively influenced by two world wars and by Australia's participation in them, but they have not affected the main rhythm of life. Yet it is obvious that in the coming years Australia cannot escape the need for a fundamental re-orientation. There is first the need to assume some of the burdens of Empire hitherto borne by Britain, in terms of defence, foreign affairs, scientific research, industrial development. Australia faces, secondly, the growing interest and pressure of the United States in the Pacific. Thirdly, the Asiatic problem looms in the background.

Australia has taken an increasingly active part in the affairs of the United Nations, but this has largely been the work of a handful of people led by Australia's active Foreign Minister, Dr. Evatt. Foreign policy must in the long run not only be adjusted to economic and military resources, but it must be supported by the people in order to be sustained and effective. As Australia's industrial and military influence and commitments grow, she will inevitably become more active in international affairs. But she will face the need for a deeper and more challenging re-orientation. So far Australia has consistently maintained her White Immigration Policy which, at the cost of numbers and diversity, has preserved an Australian population descended almost entirely from British stock. To-day the Australian Government actively fosters large-scale immigration from Britain and selective immigration from other European, preferable Nordic, countries. Even on the most optimistic estimate these sources will not be sufficient. Many people are aware of the need for broader measures, though few advocate unrestricted immigration. But a quota system, comparable with that of the United States, might give a stimulus such as a mixture of races, traditions and talents has undoubtedly produced in the United States.

It is perhaps this one-track development of Australia which accounts for the most remarkable and problematic feature of her national life: Australia has achieved a social and political stability and tranquillity of a type which other countries usually achieve at the end of centuries of

dynamic and restless development. Her political and cultural ideas are almost entirely those of Great Britain, usually with a time lag and without the stimulus of challenge and danger which makes modern Britain such a lively place in all her stress and embarrassments. Collective bargaining, social security, fairly high standards of wages, industrial arbitration and conciliation, have been developed in Australia at a relatively early stage of her development. The latest development is the universal introduction of the forty-hour week. The carefully regulated limitation of production, the leisurely pace of individual and social life, the mental isolation from the stream of world events : all these will be threatened as Australia enters the next phase of her development as an industrial and military power of growing importance. Whether it will mean greater happiness is certainly doubtful. The position of a major power usually implies imperialism, pre-occupation with war, and the threat to the stability and happiness of life. But it is impossible to have it both ways. If Australia becomes, as she shows every sign of being, the most important State in the South Western Pacific, she will have to undergo the mental revolution which follows from active participation in world affairs. In her development up to date Australia has combined the development of a liberal democracy on the western pattern with a remarkable degree of social progressiveness and an absence of imperialistic ambitions.* There is at least a hope that these Australian traditions may have a beneficial influence in international councils.

Dr. Friedmann was appointed last year to the Chair of Public Law at the University of Melbourne.)

* The claim to the control of certain Pacific islands, such as New Guinea, is essentially protective.

THE FALL OF MR. DE VALERA

By HARRY CRAIG

FOR the first time in her troubled history Ireland has achieved a major political change without at least some show of violence, without the breaking of a single human bone. Yet such achievement, which inevitably to the English mind is progress, may to the Irish be lethargy. Indeed some political commentators, familiar only with the Handy Andy aspect of Irish politics, and impressed by the lack of traditional thump in the exchanges have concluded that the Irish have gone cold on their elections. But this was not quite the truth. The coldness, the tiredness, the state of the low tension of the electorate did not indicate disinterest or, as the commentators said, a dumb resignation to Mr. De Valera's rule. It was not so simple. Ireland voted this time, like Napoleon's army marched, on its stomach; politics suddenly ceased to be a poetical exercise, and the far cry of the romantic was lost in the harsher discussion of household economics.

This election, then, was decided in the kitchen and not, as Mr. De Valera would have had it, in the stars. Yet all the usual properties were there—the flags, the bands, bonfires, party leaders walking to platforms under torchlight, the horseman-escorts for Mr. De Valera or Mr. MacBride, the terrible presence of the republican Dead—everything as before. But they did not convince nor inspire nor delude as before; the old amalgam of hates and loves—the Adam's rib of Irish republicanism—did not prick the heart as before. Formerly, one could sum up Irish politics as a hatred for a liking for England, and cover most of it. But not now. The Irish, always moved to softness by the adversity of others, at present, surprise even themselves by the generosity of their sympathy for their old enemy, England, now that she too is in "the troubles". So, this time, the electorate thought less about their running fight with England, less about the price of the Republic and more about the price of food.

Apart from this change of attitude to Britain, this revolution in thought, there were two other major causes for Mr. De Valera's downfall. First, economic grievance, the dissatisfaction of life on low wages, quite out of proportion with continually rising prices. Since 1940, the cost of living has gone up eighty-six per cent., while wages, which were pegged, only by thirteen to twenty per cent. The wage pegs came off a year ago but the disparity with prices still persists, in spite of urgent trade union negotiation and many hard fought strikes. Moreover formal rationing is at a minimum

giving way to rationing by price. During the elections, eggs sold in Dublin at 5s. or 4s. 6d. a dozen and meat, whatever weight of it the visitor may enjoy, is beyond the reach of a large proportion of the working class. Opulence swells beside poverty; large luxuriant hotels, expensive dwelling houses, cinemas, are built at the expense of hospitals and the clearance of unworthy slums. In a country where the old age pension still stood at the 1914 level of ten shillings, the purchase of costly aeroplanes and equipment, the building of large aerodromes could be described only as vanity.

The remaining factor contributing to Mr. De Valera's defeat, though it is a corollary of the factor of economic grievance, is less easily traced or defined. It arises out of the great power of example, the infection of ideas. The Irish are wanderers, they tend toward emigration. Sometimes, in search of the adventure of a new place, they go voluntarily; more often their going is the fleeing of a persecuted people, for the majority it is escape from the economic drudgery of overcrowding on small profitless farms; for others, escape from unemployment or low wages. But, it is a national characteristic that all want to come again to Irish ground—if only, as Liam O'Flaherty has said, to go on their knees and smell it. And they have brought back to their small farms, or their isolated country towns, news of a new spirit of government, social government, to people who although unable in any detail to readjust it to Irish circumstances, yet comprehend and desire it, quite naturally, for themselves.

The appearance of this third element, "a bread and butter vote", into Irish politics, which reacted so decisively on Mr. De Valera's fortunes, does not mean, however, that the left wing politics of economists have at last arrived in Ireland. As yet it is seen but darkly, unrooted in a political philosophy and unambitious beyond the satisfaction of immediate demands; it is an urge which may be variously directed and absorbed into one or other of the major capitalist parties, before, as one might expect, Labour can trap it. For Labour in Ireland up to the present has trapped little; it is a party weakened by internal dissension, lacking in imagination and over-given to equivocation. It has made the mistake of believing that sanity can only come to Irish politics when abstract, mystical politics have been, like the devils, exorcized.

Though down, Mr. De Valera is not, by any rule, out. Even without office he is still the strongest political force in the country; no fewer than forty-two per cent. of the last electorate voted for a continuation of his government; he controls the largest party in Dail Eireann. He can count sixty-seven individual heads yet the whole moves to his signals like one obedient dog. Only the closest combination of the five opposition parties, a compromising of divergent policies, and some back-ground bargaining levered Mr. De Valera out of office. No one can tell, certainly

not Mr. Costello, the new Taoiseach, at what moment Mr. De Valera will act, when, for some apparently unimportant division, he will whistle in the dog. For the gaunt, ecclesiastical-looking leader of the opposition is not only the leader of the largest party, he is also the most ruthless, the cleverest of political manoeuvrists. He it was who said that by looking into his own heart he could read the wishes of his countrymen. Obviously it is an arrogance not to be provoked needlessly, certainly not to be trifled with. The mythology surrounding Mr. De Valera will die hard, if it dies at all, for its qualities are indeed the qualities of the immortal.

It disarms criticism, absolves blame, recognizes no fault ; when something goes wrong—"It is the people with Mr. De Valera who are to blame not Mr. De Valera himself"—the myth cannot be fallible. "Dev" appears not as a man but a shape, a figment of the imagination, to be judged inhumanly. The repository of the republican tradition, in "Dev" is reincarnated—all the ghosts of the patriotic sacrifices, "the dead generations" as Padraic Pearse called them.

Probably no other country has a sense of the dead as Ireland has ; the past is in the present and the future ; they are the household gods and almost every cottage hangs some martyr's picture on its walls. All political platforms evoke the dead, each political party has its front-bench of dead—Labour has Larkin and Connolly; Fine Gael—Griffiths and Michael Collins ; Fianna Fail—the men of 1916 and the men of 1922 ; behind them, summoned without party discrimination, are the dead of all generations, back even into the twilight of medieval Ireland.

That, too, is the tradition of Mr. De Valera. He should have been dead at least twice ; only a last-hour, unsolicited reprieve saved him in 1916, and when he came out of prison in 1917, it was as the only surviving leader of the Rising, and from that day he began to enjoy those honours reserved only for the dead. Such was the source of the mystique ; the bottle out of which the "Dev" myth first began to smoke.

So unique has been the influence of Mr. De Valera on the affairs of his country, so vivid and dominating his personality, that we judge the movement of Irish politics by their flow towards or away from him. In 1932, after defeat in a civil war ten years earlier, he regained power on a New Deal policy. Politically, he was to regain the Northern Counties and establish the Republic ; economically to develop industry, to break economically the English connection by making the Island self-sufficient ; Sinn Féin, "Ourselves Alone" as Arthur Griffiths formulated it. But Mr. De Valera solved no major problem. In fact, on the question of partition, he managed only further complication. Much of the industry which he established so studiously behind tariff walls had to be protected from Belfast and Birmingham alike. The industrial North of Ireland depends on free trade with the commonwealth, the industry of the twenty-six counties upon protection. Compromise between two such

disparate economic systems, where political division already exists, is indeed difficult to conceive.

Coalition or "mixum gatherum" as Mr. De Valera contemptuously calls it, was not seriously entertained as a possibility before the result of the election was made known. Mr. MacBride's party with its youthful ambitions of forty seats—it got ten—and Labour did meet to explore the advantages of a left wing election pact; Labour opinion was, however, divided on the unsettled appearance of Mr. MacBride's party,—why some men of known conservative attachment and interest propagated Mr. MacBride's uncertain brand of radicalism—and the idea of a pact was, thereby, abandoned. The two parties did however observe an unofficial truce.

On the other hand, the old Conservative party Fine Gael (presently the largest group in the Dail Eireann after De Valera's) made, vague, unrequited suggestions of coalition, pointing out, very reasonably, that inter-party government is the logical conclusion of proportional representation and not to accept it is to argue against mathematical fact. Mr. De Valera, himself a mathematician of some repute, did not miss this point and was exhaustive in his attacks upon P.R.—the electoral system "enshrined" by his own hand in the Constitution of 1937. Indeed Mr. De Valera will gain some sympathy for what must seem to him now to have been youthful indiscretion. But for P.R.—which manufactures minorities at the cost of the major parties—he would be still securely in office. The effects of P.R. may perhaps be understood more easily by comparison with English electoral statistics: in 1945, by the simple majority system, the British Labour Party obtained sixty-one per cent. of the parliamentary seats on forty-eight per cent. of the votes cast; in February 1948, by P.R., Mr. De Valera with forty-two per cent. of the votes cast gained only forty-six per cent. of the contested seats.

The new government, comprising parties of previously hostile interests, with its carefully farmed portfolios, its precise bearing, came then, as a surprise to those for whom, previously, the politics of compromise had been anathema, a betrayal of principle. Only the *idea* of coalition was there, remotely, unapplied to Irish circumstances. Mr. Costello's coalition is popular; the spontaneity of its formation, the good temper and the tolerance it implies have had a profound effect. Indeed so far as political altruism goes the coalition lacks nothing; yet considered as a fundamental its purpose, the exclusion of the "strong government" of Mr. De Valera, is a negative one. The contentious aspects of party policy are placed in abeyance, and government is to be by the reduction of policy to its lowest common denominator. Thus, the emphasis of government is on the modification, the reformation of existing legislation rather than on the initiation of new. In fact, the one political cliché noticeably absent is that Mr. Costello's Government is not "boldly marching" anywhere.

The programme of coalition, a plan of ten points drafted by Labour, is thus directed against immediate grievances and, although not all of it will be interpreted as Labour sees it, it is a radical programme and acceptance as drawn Fine Gael towards the left. Fine Gael, originating in Cumman na nGael, which under Mr. W. T. Cosgrave held office before Mr. De Valera, has been in turn an associate of General O'Duffy's fascist blue-shirt movement and, during the war, the defender of civil and parliamentary liberties against Mr. De Valera's Government by Decree. To-day, as the focus of whatever organized public opinion there is in the country, it is the only example of a Liberal party—in the British sense of the word—in Ireland.

Mr. Costello's ministers, though tentative before an opposition with more knowledge of departmental files than they can as yet command, have, nevertheless, shown a considerable confidence in the announcement of new policy. The most important change is in the policy for agriculture. Agricultural production is again to be aimed at the British market; Britain demands cattle, so tillage, the main plank of Mr. De Valera's self-sufficiency platform, will be replaced by grazing. The proposed inauguration of a transatlantic air-service has been indefinitely postponed, while hospitals and T.B. sanatoria are to be extended; the new health minister is a young doctor who was promoted to Cabinet rank on the day when he first entered the Dail.

But it is yet too early to have more than a scrappy knowledge of the possible effects of the new Government. Mr. De Valera held office for sixteen years and, so far as parliamentary inquiry would allow, governed in silence, keeping secret as much of the workings of his department as he recently could. Thus, the changeover is made more difficult. Yet whatever the demerits of coalition, whatever the insecurity of the present Government with its bare majority of seven deputies, it has already restored to the public a new faith in politics—a faith which had been undoubtedly disturbed by the "mild dictatorship" of Mr. De Valera. For so far as he ignored the opinion and demands of the opposition, Mr. De Valera was a dictator.

HAGANAH

BY PETER SINCLAIR-THOMSON

'HAGANAH' is a Hebrew word meaning simply 'defence'. It had its origin in the defence groups which safeguarded Jewish life and property in Palestine in the late 1870's, later formed into the Organization of Jewish Watchmen, (Hashomer) in 1907. This defence arose directly as a result of the massacre of the Jews of Safad in 1823 and of the repercussions in Palestine of the Damascus Blood Libel in 1840. Throughout the Turkish régime in Palestine, there was little or no public security provided by the Government. In those days, defence was a matter of the fist and the cudgel rather than of firearms, but it instilled the rudiments of military training and personal bravery in inexperienced settlers. During the 1914-1918 war the Shomrim, members of Hashomer, formed the basis of the Jewish Legion that served with the British forces.

After the publication of the Balfour Declaration, it was feared, with the large entry of immigrants to the country, that the Shomrim would tend to become a dominating group, able by force of arms to impose its will on the community. It was therefore decided to create, in its stead, a defence body in which all able-bodied Jews should serve. This body was to be known as Haganah and was to constitute the Territorial Army of Palestinian Jewry. During the disturbances of 1920 and 1921 there was considerable loss of Jewish life and therefore secret preparation for the development of Haganah began. Considerable protection was thus afforded the Jewish population by the "illegal" Haganah in the 1929 disturbances, although 150 Jews were killed in the towns and much Jewish property was destroyed.

The real value of Haganah was shown in the disturbances that broke out in 1936, on a far greater scale than any previously carried out by the Arabs alone. It was found quite impossible to get troops to outlying Jewish settlements in time to save life and property. The Haganah not only filled the breach completely, but also demonstrated that it was a defence organization and not a private army of aggression. Winning the admiration of the military commanders, these succeeded in persuading the Administration to permit Haganah to hold a legal quota of arms for self-defence, thus leaving the British troops free to carry out offensive operations. At the same time a number of the Haganah in each settlement were enrolled as supernumerary police.

The first unofficial co-operation of Haganah with the Administration,

and the first use of it in an offensive capacity, occurred in 1938 when the late General (then Captain) Wingate conceived the idea of fighting the Arabs by using their own tactics. For this he required loyal men with an intimate knowledge of the terrain and formed, with the whole-hearted support of Field Marshal (then General) Wavell, small "commando" groups of Haganah, under British Officers and N.C.O.s, trained by himself on the identical lines which he afterwards adopted for his Chindits. There is no doubt that these small groups did more to put an end to the disturbances than any other military operations, and Haganah received the highest praise, both from General Wavell and from Wingate.

This entry into the offensive field of military training did not alter Haganah's character as a defence force. The report of the Royal Commission noted this in particular and stated (page 121) :

It is true of course that in times of disturbance the Jews, as compared with the Arabs, are the law abiding section of the population ; and, indeed, throughout the whole series of outbreaks, and under very great provocation, they have shown a notable capacity for discipline and self-restraint.

In the 1939-1945 war Haganah again formed the backbone of Jewish military effort. Not only did it provide, with the permission of the Administration, the bulk of Palestine's Home Guard, but also encouraged the enlistment of 35,000 men and women into the British forces. These Palestinian Jews served in every branch of the three services and their contribution to the various intelligence departments and to resistance movements in occupied territory was considerable. Many young Jews and Jewesses lost their lives after being dropped as agents in enemy territory or in organizing Jewish and other resistance movements, including the Warsaw rising, in all European countries. Finally, and most important, Haganah offered six major services under a "post occupational" scheme arranged for the possible occupation of Palestine by the Germans. These covered :

- (i) Provision of a guerrilla force.
- (ii) Provision of a special task force to cut communications after the British evacuation.
- (iii) Provision of a technical unit to establish an underground radio network.
- (iv) Provision of intelligence agents.
- (v) Creation of a task force to cut off a German retreat in a British counter-offensive.

There is clearly a great deal of difference between a disciplined organization such as this and the terrorist groups who have carried out the dastardly acts of murder, not only against Britons and Arabs, but against their own with and kin. The Irgun and Stern groups are both extremists politically and rebels against all forms of discipline, national, political or military. Many of them are ex-members of the Maquis and other former under-

ground groups of the European war. Others are coarsened by years of incarceration in the death camps. Thus, to them terror and murder are things of small consideration and, from their experience, the only means of obtaining the freedom they have fought for elsewhere for so long.

Two points emerge from the character of Haganah. The first is that by its very nature it is a non-political body since it includes all shades of political opinion, as does any other army, and secondly, that it is its own master. It is not, as is often thought, under the direct control of the Jewish Agency. In accordance with the terms of the Mandate the Jewish Agency is :

... a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may effect the ... interests of the Jewish population of Palestine and subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country. (Article 4).

The Jewish Agency, therefore, is in no sense a governing body and has no power, nor means of enforcing power, upon any part of the Jewish population of Palestine except by means of appeals to the public, which means have constantly been adopted. (This explains the reason why the Agency has been unable to deal with the terrorists.) There does exist, as is well known, a Haganah liaison officer within the Agency. His function, however, is purely that implied in his title and there is no compulsion upon Haganah to carry out Agency policy. This point has, in fact, given rise in the past to disagreement over the subject of immigration.

Haganah, since the beginning of the Mufti's attacks on Jews and Arabs in opposition to the UNO decision, has endeavoured to protect Jewish and Arab life and property. (This has been necessitated by the policy of neutrality adopted by His Majesty's Government in their effort to refrain from taking sides with either the defender of or the aggressor against the UNO decision in which they had no part.) In recent weeks, this protection of life and property has developed into offensive action. Many people—including Jews within Palestine and without—both in the Jewish Agency and in the Zionist Organization, deplore such a policy on the part of Haganah and claim that it has sunk to the level of the terrorists in adopting the tactics of senseless reprisals. This is an instance of false judgment of events alone. It has long been established as an essential strategic principle that attack is the best means of defence and anyone who has had experience of Arab guerrilla warfare cannot but agree that passive resistance to their attacks results only in a speedy increase in their size and number. The only possible means of defence against these attacks is to strike at their heart, at their headquarters or at their centres of recruitment. In this way only can such guerrilla warfare be brought to an end and so halt the steeply rising rate of Jewish and Arab casualties and damage to property.

The terrorist groups, who blur the true picture of Haganah by their

wanton acts, are cutting across the policy of Haganah and acting as fifth columnists against Haganah efforts. Under the present "neutral" policy of the Palestine Government, whereby, as has been said, action is taken against defender and aggressor alike, it is impossible for Haganah to prevent terrorist activity. It is only with the establishment of the Jewish State, and the formation of a Jewish militia from the ranks of Haganah under the jurisdiction of the Jewish Government, that the terrorists will be stopped.

It should not be forgotten how only seven months ago Haganah men were giving their lives in an effort to put down the terrorists. A leading article in the *Daily Express* of June 20, 1947, relating how a member of Haganah gave his life to prevent the blowing up of a British Army headquarters by terrorists, said: "He did not die for Britain. He died for the principle of the rule of law, and for the authority of the United Nations in whose hands the future of Palestine lies. The help of Haganah in preserving peace should be given full recognition. It is a fine, courageous answer to the propagandists who pretend that the thugs are supported by all Jewry." There seems no reason, when the facts are known, why men of this calibre should be accused of motive totally repugnant to them and totally at discord with the fine record of Haganah.

(Captain Sinclair-Thomson served before and during the 1939-1945 war as a Special Service Intelligence Officer.)

GYPSY ORIGINS

BY RUPERT CROFT-COOK

THE history of the gypsies is still a speculative and controversial one. Much of the fantasy and mystery which covered it has been stripped away and a few essentials have been established beyond doubt. But the tendency of scholars, Borrow among them, to stress the occult in gypsy character and legend has not made for elucidation.

It is the philologists who speak with most authority. A study of all that remains in England of the Romani tongue and on the Continent of its variously corrupted forms, has established one positive fact—that this language owes its origin to India. Naturally enough there have been attempts to be more specific, to discover from what Indian people or caste the race emerged. There are a score of theories, and as many conjectures about the date at which they left the east, the route by which they came westward, their purpose in travelling from Hindustan, and so on. But there is not, and there is not likely to be, any certainty in the matter—which seems to excite the scholars to more ingenious postulations. They hold varying opinions on the basic question as to whether the gypsies are akin to some of the nomadic tent-dwellers of modern India, or whether they are identifiable with the ten thousand Indian musicians who, according to Firdusi, were imported into Persia in the fifth century. Nor has that earlier and persuasive theory of Grellmann's that they were low-caste Hindus fleeing from Tamburlaine, ever been finally disposed of, however it may be out of favour with modern gypsiologists on the grounds that there were gypsies in Europe before Tamburlaine's time. And even when it is admitted, as it must be, that Romanes is a language of Sanskrit origin (it is in fact an Indian language with a still evident likeness to Hindustani), it is not known whether the gypsies can definitely be called an Indian people, either Aryan or Dravidian, or whether their history pre-dates even the Aryan invasion of India and goes back to some dim civilization from which they had escaped in still earlier times to make their way across the Indus ; whether in fact they might not be Egyptians after all who, migratory as now, had wandered eastwards one, two, three thousand years before Christ and had remained in India since then so that they had absorbed their Sanskrit tongue. Nothing, indeed, absolutely nothing is known categorically of their racial origins.

If only they had preserved some remnants of religion, these might provide a clue. But as Richard Jefferies said : " The Negroes have their

fetich, every nation its idols ; the gypsy alone has none—not even a superstitious observance. It is very strange that it should be so at this the height of our civilization, and you might go many thousand miles and search from Africa to Australia before you would find another people without a Deity.” Jefferies exaggerates when he says that not even a superstitious observance is left, for there are such matters as the burning of a dead man’s possessions which may well be of Hindu origin. But there is nothing which might not have been a usage, half religious, half hygienic, picked up by any nomadic people for its own preservation. There is nothing which stamps the gypsy as having certainly belonged to a Hindu caste, or even as having been a Hindu outcaste. If he was once the former, one would have thought that there would be vestiges of Hindu observance left in his daily life after he had migrated westward, but most arguments in favour of this are specious.

To avoid all more or less fanciful theorizing we must be content to see in the gypsies a race of people which, both migratory and nomadic by habit, left India and wandered westward. But how long, for how many decades or even centuries they may have tarried on the way, in the Balkans for instance, is again unknown. They seem to have reached western Europe at some time about, or just before, the beginning of the fifteenth century—that being the period of the earliest references to them in Continental chronicles. From then onwards the story grows more clearly defined. There are early woodcuts which show the women clothed in something suspiciously like the sari, that most beautiful garment which has been the feminine fashion in India for two thousand years. And there are descriptions of those “ masterful beggars ” which—though they vary according to the fancy and imagination of the fifteenth century journalist who wrote them—do allow us to form some mental picture of the turbulent multitudes who infested Europe at that time, moving great distances as stealthily as deer, appearing suddenly at the gates of cities and demanding alms from the inhabitants on the grounds that they were pilgrims or penitents who carried letters patent from the Pope.

The men were horse-dealers, a trade which seems almost invariable among nomadic peoples, and remains the staple business of the gypsy to this day. They were also wood-workers, metal-workers, mummers, singers and dancers—occupations all which are wholly consistent with the life of a wandering tribe from the East, and which, in some degenerate form, remain as the pursuits of our modern *didakais*. A gypsy squatting by an English wood cutting clothes-pegs with swift deft strokes of his knife, or ornamenting his waggon with curious carved designs, may have come a long way from the Indian wood-carver, but his pre-occupation with the wood and the tool have not changed. The gypsy tinsmith or knife-grinder with his barrow, who can make a miniature kettle from a

penny piece, is perhaps less far removed from the metal-workers whose belts and harness gleamed with silver five centuries ago. The men who never remain long in an inn at night without encouraging one of their number to sing in ringing tones some sentimental English song of the last century, or the gypsy circle which will form round any youth who will perform the astonishing tap-dances which his people love, may be poor reminders of those who performed at Holyrood House in 1530, but it is hard to find even a half-caste gypsy to-day for whom singing and dancing are not an integral part of the happy life.

At Bologna in 1422, the women were described as being able to foretell a man's future truly, though few who consulted them returned without a lost purse. The women of the band wandered in groups and entered the houses of the inhabitants where, while some told idle tales others laid hold of what was in their reach. Of a visit to Paris, five years later, we are told that there were witches in their company who looked into people's hands and told what would happen to them. In the English Act of 1530 "they by Palmestre could tell Menne and Womens Fortunes." And so on. Scarcely an early reference to gypsies but mentions the powers of divination claimed by the women, till "cross the gypsy's palm with silver" has become a by-word.

To me history is a visual thing, and I find the picture of these migrants moving across medieval Europe a vivid and attractive one. What the contemporary descriptions lack in information of value to the historian, such as details of numbers, place of origin, language and religious usage, they make up for by their sometimes racy portraiture, their graphic snapshots of a people who they seem to have viewed with wonder and even jealousy. Groome's Introduction to his *Gypsy Folk Tales* most succinctly quotes these descriptions, and the picture remains of great companies of swarthy man and women, their leaders well mounted and lavishly dressed and ornamented with silver, followed by their game dogs. The following multitude was poorer in dress and ornament, the men "very black" the women with their "faces covered with wounds, hair as black as a horse's tail" while nearly all "had both ears pierced and in each ear a silver ring." The date of these descriptions seems remote in Europe but in India it is yesterday. Whether or not the nomads had but recently come from beyond the Indus they are recognizable enough to anyone who knows India, and the flabbergasted awe of the dwellers in the comparatively tidy little communities of fifteenth century Europe may well be understood.

Then some of the gypsies—not even a conjecture at their numbers can be made—crossed the Channel to the British Isles. It is fascinating to consider how they made this move. What ship's captain for what fee brought these black foreigners across the water? So far as we know it was their first sea journey. Did they embark with their horses and game

dogs, go swiftly ashore at their English or Scottish port, and disappear into the landscape? Was their arrival watched by the scared subjects of Henry VII or Henry VIII who dwelt in the fishing port which the French or Dutch ship had chosen? Did they send scouts across first who returned to say that Britain was a land of promise where the fruits and livestock were plentiful enough to support a few hundred picturesque satellites and that the palms of the country-women itched to be read?

I think that they had already learnt the value of their own savage and unfamiliar mien. For what would the inhabitants of any lonely Tudor village have done when a wild and devilish-looking band of black men and women were camped close by, but count their sheep and drive in their cattle and lock their doors till this visitation from another world had passed? And soon began the long and painful struggle between nomad and householder, between gypsy and *gorgio*, which has continued to this day. The gypsies knew how to intimidate by numbers and by the strangeness of their barbarian appearance, or by playing on the superstitious fears of the rustics, so that the "gypsy's curse" is still a threat in rural England. They knew, too, how to enchant and entertain their hosts and could so captivate a Scottish monarch that he gave them monstrous privileges. Outcasts for the whole of their racial memory, they defended themselves, and fed themselves, and entertained themselves at the expense of the peaceful population, and if they did not also enrich themselves it was because they were, as they are to-day, inveterate spendthrifts without a suggestion of cupidity or usuriousness in their character.

"The first undoubted record referring to Gypsies in Great Britain is:—'1505, April 22. Item to the Egyptians be the king's command vij lib.' " This statement was first made by H. T. Crofton in the *Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society*, was quoted with acknowledgments by David MacRitchie in his *Scottish Gypsies under the Stewarts*, from this with acknowledgments by Groome five years later, and since then, without the grace of any recognition, by various journalists whose research has taken them to the three historians, but not to their sources. The statement has not yet been contradicted. No specific mention has been made of Egyptians before that date though as the three scholars once again point out (each bowing to his predecessor) there was an Act passed in Scotland in 1449 concerning certain "masterful beggars" going about the country with "horses, hunds and other goods" which may well have been directed against gypsies. It is safe I think to assume (though not without readiness to be contradicted by any evidence which may yet be brought to light) that the gypsies landed on our shores at some time in the fifteenth century, as they spread over Europe in the fourteenth. My own reason for accepting these suppositions is a literary one which I cannot advance against the fruits of research—it is that the tone of all these early references implies the writers' surprise and wonder on first beholding gypsies. If

indeed they had been at large in the Continent before about thirteen hundred or in Britain before fourteen hundred, surely their observers would have spoken of them in more commonplace terms as an increasingly familiar phenomenon? Yet all the chronicles dwell on the bizarre, the unexpected and the novel in their appearance.

For three hundred years, until the interest of the nineteenth century was aroused, gypsy history in England remains obscure, and such references as there are to 'Egyptians' are mostly records of prosecutions and persecutions of the dark people by a citizenry often outraged by their wayward life. During that time they must have increased vastly in numbers, but they kept their racial integrity as no alien race, not even the Jewish, better succeeded in doing. Until a century ago they remained essentially foreigners speaking their own language, marrying within their own tribes, following their own leaders and regarding the *gorgios* as enemies whom they must fear and as dupes from whom they might profit.

It is this long period of growth in isolation which interests me most, for I find it wonderful that the hunted gypsies should have survived at all, still more so that they flourished and increased, as they must have done. There was, for instance, an Act in the twenty-seventh year of Henry VIII's reign from which Hoyland quotes: "Whereas certain outlandish people, who do not profess any crafts or trade whereby to maintain themselves, but go about in great numbers from place to place, using insidious, underhand means to impose on his Majesty's subjects, making them believe that they understand the art of foretelling to men and women their good and evil fortune, by looking in their hands, whereby they frequently defraud people of their money; likewise are guilty of thefts and highway robberies; it is hereby ordered that the said vagrants, commonly called Egyptians, in case they remain one month in the kingdom, shall be proceeded against as thieves and rascals; and on the importation of any such Egyptian, he (the importer) shall forfeit £40 for every trespass."

Hoyland further reprints records to show that cargoes of them were re-shipped to the Continent in the same reign, and passing to Elizabeth's time recalls an Act under which it was "felony without benefit of clergy" to remain with gypsies for a month or more. And so on for a couple of centuries. It was a crime to be one of the outlandish people calling themselves Egyptians and not infrequently a crime punishable, on some pretext, by death. It is a long and tragic record of hangings, imprisonment for long periods on trivial charges supported by the flimsiest evidence and in later years of transportation for life, the "hulks". George Hall, writing in 1909, said that he had never yet known an elderly gypsy whose memory lacked a store of what may be called transportation tales, and even a modern gypsy informant of mine spoke of the transportation of an ancestor.

There is little doubt that between the *gorgios* and the gypsies during these centuries were both fear and hatred. The Romanies had no love for the "happy folk in housen" who would arrest loiterers from the tribes and imprison stray gypsies as vagabonds. The house-dwellers, on the other hand, could scarcely be expected to welcome a string of satellites who would fill their wives' heads with the nonsense of fortune-telling and live off their land without recognition of such a sound principle as that of ownership. Moreover there must have been, I feel, an element of jealousy in the *gorgio* disapproval of the vagrant brotherhood, the envy of the well-fed domesticated animal for his wild fellow, the envy which a man tied to his profitable labours will feel for the shiftless but free. It was the fact that the gypsies lived none too badly and without routine which must have infuriated the honest labourer, and his envy and anger, though there is less cause for them, persist to this day.

But in the nineteenth century when first Hoyland and Crabb and then Borrow and the other students began to take an interest in the Romanies, they had changed vastly from the cut-throat gangs of oriental horsemen who had intimidated house-dwellers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in the eighteenth had become persecuted vagrants who made incursions into criminal life. Slowly the dark easterners whose forbears had chosen the chilly island of Britain as their travelling ground were making attempts to accommodate themselves to our life. Their language as a pure and separate tongue, was already dying and their speech even among themselves had grown thick with English words. They had assumed English names, or perhaps had had English names thrust on them. They had married into the families of house-dwellers. They had even begun to work in a spasmodic, or at least in a seasonal way, taking their natural swiftness of movement into account at fruit and hop picking, and turning to profit the crafts—basket making, wood carving, wood-cutting, tinkering and horse-doctoring—which they had once used only for the maintenance of their own communal and individual life. The men had grown accustomed to dealing in horseflesh with *gorgio* farmers and coopers, the women had begun a more orderly kind of calling, with baskets over their arms, ready enough to tell fortunes but selling their wares too, in a more business-like fashion. And although they were still, as Borrow took care to show, a secret people, capable of travelling forty miles in a night, gliding out of Norfolk and reappearing under another name in Essex, though they still for the most part married and died without the conscious assistance or even the knowledge of house-dwellers, though they still sickened if they were kept between walls, they were certainly domesticated compared with the long-haired tribesmen of Tudor times.

It does not seem that a more articulate knowledge of their own past would have aided the gypsies greatly in their wanderings. They were frequently called in one country by the name of the people of another which

they had recently left, or with which they were associated. They seem to have made no objection to those misnomers, if they were aware of them, and as "Saracens", "Egyptians", "Bohemians" were content to travel. It may be presumed that they were illiterate even in India, for scholars among them would surely have aroused interest at the time when the race was a novelty in Europe. But they were natural story-tellers and as Groome has shown, their folklore like their language owes much to the east. How long, I wonder, did it take for their racial memory to lose all recollection of India? And could a gypsy in Europe in the fifteenth century have told a questioner, if he would, from what country his ancestors came?

The name "Egyptians" may have been given to them in Britain for no other reason than that they were dark. In the days of blonde Queen Bess, when brunettes were out of fashion, Shakespeare summarized a lover's delusions by making him see "Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt." The line has been quoted to indicate that Shakespeare was aware of the dark foreigners who had come to England and been given the name of Egyptians. But may not the reverse be true? If "Egyptian" was a synonym for "blackamoor", a term used for anyone swarthy, as well it may have been, its application to the Romanies is understandable. And they were scarcely likely to object when one of their number was given the title "Lord of Little Egypt."

It was their ignorance of their own past which made them seem "mysterious" to students. A Jew was a Jew with his history and religion forever at his finger-tips, but who were these strangers who knew nothing of their ancestors? Borrow suggested that they kept such knowledge to themselves, but that was only a part of the mystification in which he delighted. They did not, they do not know more about themselves than that they are gypsies, born in a tent or waggon. The mystery was an outward not an inward thing—a visual mystery of queer, dark, strangely clad people passing across the land at dusk in silent fraternities, pitching their tents on a lonely heath, talking a strange language among themselves, carousing there for a night or two perhaps and in the white mist of one morning disappearing without a trace. How could the farmer—or even the lord of the manor, for that matter, be other than mystified?

It is to India that one must go to have the last sentimental traces of that mystification removed. For India has changed so little from the land which the gypsies left a mere five centuries or thousand years ago, that one can see them as they were before they set out on their westward journey. One can see their encampments outside many villages, one can watch the women with their tattoo marks ("faces covered with wounds") and black hank of hair ("hair black as a horse's tail") and their little tents constructed exactly as are those on Epsom Downs to-day. These

people are outcaste nomads who have roamed India from time immemorial, and the Indian scene would be unfamiliar without them. But take them as they are with their great silver ear-rings and anklets, their dirty but vividly coloured clothes, their jibbering and laughter, their caution never to approach within reach of a stranger, like half-tamed sparrows, their packs of scurvy dogs, their innumerable bright-eyed, beautiful but lousy children, and imagine them arriving on the outskirts of an English village in Tudor times, and you will see how the word "mysterious" has clung to them.

Besides, so accustomed is the tired world to the migrations that follow warfare that it is puzzled by one that was apparently one of peace. Small wonder that Grellmann supposed the gypsies to have come west to escape enforced Mohammedanism imposed by Tamburlaine, since in the Christian era such racial movements seem only to have come from war or religion. The Parsis moving south east to Gujerat to practise their Zoroastrianism undisturbed, the Puritans sailing for Virginia, these are understandable. So are the great movements that follow the conquests of the Moors, the Mongols, the Turks. But here was an exodus and an invasion that seemed spontaneous, a race on the move for the pleasure of travel, even crossing the sea to find its way about a remote island.

So we must read this or that argument about the gypsies, note with genuine delight each scholar's discovery throwing light on one of the vague chapters of their past, but we cannot hope for more. There are a few potential sources of information still untapped; this point may be clarified or that philological problem solved, but the story of the gypsies may never be wholly known.

A WORD ON KATHERINE MANSFIELD

BY SYLVA NORMAN

PERHAPS a quarter-century is a shorter age than we were led to believe in our schooldays. Three months then seemed a dismal tunnel, and a decade was something astronomical, unexplored ; as it were, a light-year. Time shrinks, and across the wrinkles of its unquiet surface we can almost touch the days when Katherine Mansfield was writing her last stories, unwilling to believe that she died twenty-five years ago. But since twenty-five years are there, between her and our present selves, we can use their evidence that she will not die now. The danger is past. The gigantic second storm that might have wiped her out in its idiot fury has spent its force without displacing her, so that after the bombing and confusion peering eyes may gaze and voices outside the illuminated circle whisper with our Else the washerwoman's child, "I seen the little lamp". She lives, if not boisterously, in her own works and through her progeny, since the short story in this country changed in character and conception when her writings became known. Tchekov, to be sure, comes into the matter. That influence, or more accurately affinity, is undeniable ; but it is less than just to look on Katherine Mansfield as a sort of pipe-line bringing Russian oil for Britain to burn at midnight. Something of the sort has been suggested and this too she will survive.

Amongst other available fallacies, the Mood of her Moment might be emphasized. No doubt each period has its special drama that affects its writers, and if Coleridge and Wordsworth could be directly kindled by the French Revolution we had, in this interim war, besides Rupert Brooke the "swimmer into cleanness leaping", a heroic tale of C. E. Montague the Mancunian dyeing his grey hair brown in order to squeeze into the cattle-trucks bound for wars in France. But Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen and others were there to invert the glamour, and its sequel was a sapless age wherein those who had not been through the horror croaked its disillusionment, dragged every brief ideal *à la lanterne*, and turned gold, when they could find it, into lead. Even if not "cynical" (a word that worked overtime for many years) they were unhappy, unhearty, generally distrustful of any but the gloomiest signs. To say that Katherine Mansfield was independent of all this would be neither true nor flattering ; no writer who counts is utterly detached. She was impatient herself when, as a reviewer, she handled mediocre novels written to a formula that has, so far as artistic truth went, been knocked

crooked by the four gaunt years. A "change of heart" was needed. "I can't imagine," she wrote to her husband, "how after the war these men can pick up the old threads as though it had never been."

Old threads though, speaking in quite other fashion, she *did* pick up, precisely because it had been, or was being, and she had found, in common with so many after a later war than hers, that flatness and despair are not fruitful subjects for a fiction writer. Satire and cerebration in the manner of the earlier Aldous Huxley could be cut to sparkle, giving the venomous toad its precious jewel; or one could experiment dizzily with technical factors, and foster a literary cubism with a weather-eye on the abstruse antics of James Joyce. In this fog a study of both Stein and Einstein might yield spurious bearings to pilot a writer into some publicity. But the little corpses sunk beneath the wave may be left in decent privacy. Katherine Mansfield turned to her own memories. Memories of a New Zealand childhood were the base of those inter-related stories "Prelude" (with its first draft "The Aloe"), "At the Bay", "The Doll's House", which she had thought of weaving into some kind of a novel. Her sources then were simple and objective. The finished product too looked simple and objective, but the two were linked or separated by a painful underground progress of assimilation, condensation, transmutation, till they emerged as her intimate personal property, obeying the sage's philosophical dictum: "Look in your heart, and write". Much that formerly stuffed out even the short story was simply not there. The resultant clarity of primary colours, like impressionist painting, confronted you the more clearly and insistently. By a further paradox, it was even like those free, spontaneous pictures children have been encouraged to paint—this work that, as we know from the Journal, cost her so much effort and heart-searching. Marie Laurencin has felt and conveyed this childlike quality in her illustrations to a selection from the stories printed in a limited luxury Quarto in Italy just before the war.* But Marie Laurencin shows only the children, not what the children see with their large eyes so near the ground and nature so much magnified. Katherine Mansfield's vision easily took this angle. She was at home there, more than in the adult world, and her children live because she lives in them. "A mosquito and a wasp came to the edge of the honey dish to drink. The mosquito was a lovely little high stepping gazelle, but the wasp was a fierce roaring tiger." And as they saw, so could they hear:

For these little voices: the bee, the fly
The leaf that taps, the pod that breaks,
The breeze on the grass-tops bending by,
The shrill quick sound that the insect makes.

Those lines are written in her own character; and after all no child

**The Garden Party and Other Stories*. With coloured lithographs by Marie Laurencin. Officina Bodini, Verona, 1939. London: Collins. 42s.

has quite such a progressed articulate perception. So we begin to see that middle process between the first encounter and the final showing. There is no need to guess at what her *Journal* gives so amply. The process—just before the ultimate freedom—was nearly always an unhappy one, a fight against frustration or untrustworthy facility, a painful reaching out as though to grow some organ that did not normally exist. At first she felt the maddening inability to snare the ideas she glimpsed, and get them down in a way that satisfied. Hundreds of blue birds, and not one to keep its colour! "I am all right—sky high. And even in my brain, in my head, I can think and act and write wonders—wonders; but the moment I really try to put them down I fail miserably." (*Journal*, December 8, 1916). And when she has put them down they seem to her like false starts, none of them "in the middle of the note." Right back in her New Zealand days, in 1906, ease and spontaneity eluded her, when she had "many ideas but no grip of any subject." And in time she came sternly to repudiate easy writing with a deep spiritual distrust. It may seem that she deliberately tortured herself in the exhausting determination to bore down to truth, rejecting more and more of what would have been perfectly acceptable in a fiction writer. (Take those unfinished stories with two or three alternative beginnings; can we honestly judge, without trying to follow her own mazy twists of feeling, which one is best?) During her last years literary life was all one passionate, painful search for essence, for an inner radiance, for the kernel in the heart of the transfigured fruit. She was writing with her life blood. The reader may well ask: why all this torture, all this aspiration and rejection? Is this in fact the way a genius works? Did Shakespeare, Stendhal, Fielding, go through these contortions in order to produce such robust matter in such quantities?

The question is perhaps unfair; there may be some inverse ratio between scope and striving—the greater the output the less, not relatively but absolutely, the strain. But we must face it that Katherine Mansfield, for all her exquisite productions, is not of the stuff that makes great writers. And this is not only because her scope is limited; for indeed the dilemma of Ma Parker leads by its single thread to a note as universal as any based on the suffering of thousands. There are too many negatives though. Within her mind one pictures a 'No Trespassers' board at the entrance of a score of avenues she might have strayed in; and the one she chose was never the broad-walk. In a certain twisting of her pathway she is not unique. Virginia Woolf, for instance, was for the most part a natural poet who wrote in prose. But Katherine Mansfield would not allow herself even the easeful singing of the lyric bard, except when "off duty" she permitted an escape in actual verse melodious with notes parallel to her contemporaries De la Mare, Yeats and Rupert Brooke. Above all, she would not let herself be just a teller of tales. If a story had not, for her, a deep intrinsic meaning, a root in the profundity of life, it was not worth

putting on paper. She had begun to apply this means test even to reviews. It had become a habit—if we dare apply the word in speaking of a mind so honest—to scrutinize and re-ponder everything, prepared in innumerable cases to reject. The reason may, I think, be traced right back to the beginning when, like so many with artistic yearnings, she could not break through into creation. There she would sit—like Joseph Conrad on his thwarted days when he had three sentences to show, *crossed out*, for eight hours' work—with her faculties tingling, ready for the theme that did not come. Though she conquered this inhibition which might have prevented her once for all from being a writer, she retained her tactics, straining her ears for all the questioning voices, and mistakenly, one feels, withholding her confidence. For when the felicitous note does come it brings perfection with it, even speed. It can, but for a few verbal alterations, be trusted, and left to dance away with the theme alone. Spread out the product for analysis, scrutinize it in sections, and numbers of faults may seem to show. It may even be improved considerably, when not rejected; but to work this way is not congenial to creation, and brings the process back full circle to the first point of striving negativity. The torture then must necessarily be great.

I am far from suggesting that so fine a portrayer of humanity lived in a perpetual state of frustration, only that a barrier of her own making held her back. Without her over-rigid discipline so much that is hinted at in her writing might have broken joyfully in, tearing down the trespasser boards and expanding the whole outlook and comprehensiveness. But she did not want it. Expansion to her would mean a useless spilling out over the surface at the expense of the delving she required. Up to a point she is right that to gain in breadth is to lose intensity. The question is: how far is it desirable in a fiction writer to pursue intensity and abandon breadth? Intensity, for instance, usually cuts out humour. She had plenty; but that too was kept sternly disciplined and could flow out with more freedom in her *Journal*. She was, on her own confession, one of those solitary walkers who enjoy jokes by themselves that would go stony with a statelier companion. She looks at Lloyd George's latest and most eloquent metaphor in the paper wrapping her rhubarb and invents his memorial tablet: *In the hour of England's most imminent peril he grasped his Niblick and struck out for the open course*; but what *espèce de Niblickisme* will the French make of it? she asks. Or there is wit that can triumph through illness:

Almighty Father of All and Most Celestial Giver

Who has granted to us thy children a heart and lungs and a liver;

If upon me should descend thy beautiful gift of tongues

Incline not thine Omnipotent ear to my remarks on lungs.

Humour may enter the most passionate story as a satire on the modern bloods, as it does in *Bliss* where Bilks's new poem has the "incredibly beautiful" opening line: "Why must it always be Tomato Soup?" "It's so deeply true, don't you feel? Tomato soup is so dreadfully

eternal." This is a too slick gibe at intellectualism ; but she would have smiled appreciatively to know she had become, in 1936 and 1937 a thesis subject for two German university students, examining her philosophy and her style. She is all alive to the comic factor in solemnity (Charles : Pray dear papa, what is the Solar System ? Papa : Wipe your nose, Charles, and I will tell you.). In the stories humour is incidental, delicate and subordinate. We should rejoice to see it for once picking up the whole Burnell family at the seaside and racing with them away across the foreshore, coupled up soundly, as it were, not dancing a *pas seul* like a wandering Puck.

This matter of intensity versus breadth leads straight to the query whether the progressed short story, freed as it is from so much of the machinery of fiction, is to be considered as nearer to the novel or to the lyric—or even the devotional—poem. Through its movement, characterization, grouping and development it approaches the novel ; it leans towards poetry in its concentration on a single universalized aspect, whether expressed by the Grecian urn as " Beauty is truth, truth beauty ", or by our Else the washerwoman's daughter as " I seen the little lamp ". Katherine Mansfield strove in her later work for the poetic analogy while her solidly realized characters pulled the other way. This in itself would be a drag on free creation. We have to remember too, though it may seem irrelevant, that all the self-scourging and urgent stretching-out for life and love are products of acute, deep-seated physical illness. Towards the end her personal writings, no less than Keats's letters to Fanny Brawne, are evidence of what amounts to a pathological condition. The body really dictated what the spirit felt and what the mind expressed. She was luckier than Keats who wasted his passion on a commonplace girl, in escaping to a mystical vision. But just as Keats could utter his central and unaberrant truth: " Bright Star, would I were steadfast as thou art," so she, during the last few months of life, wrote this evidence of her faith and striving : " But warm, eager, living life—to be rooted in life—to learn, to desire to know—to feel, to think, to act. That is what I want. And nothing less." To write this from the keenness of her suffering is a gesture comparable to Emily Brontë's deathless iteration : " No coward soul is mine."

She did, let us say, choose poetic lyricism and then let the novel in. It is a difficult compromise to be always pressing, not a quart into a pint pot, but a gallon into a gill. More life—but bottled. But *why*—why bottle it ? the exuberant, ample writer would complain. Doesn't the whole wonder of the thing consist in budding, extending, leaping suddenly on to strange territory you had never clapped eyes on but which you know (having approached it by your secret tunnels) to be your own ? Even if piracy and trespassing come into it, what matter ? What matter indeed ? Only that if you are *all* the time listening for the faint gnat voices you cannot have this galloping about. " Listen," she could whisper to us,

even in 1911 before the threat of wars, "to what I hear":

Through the sad dark the slowly ebbing tide
Breaks on a barren shore, unsatisfied
A strange wind flows, . . . then silence. I am fain
To turn to Loneliness, to take her hand,
Cling to her, waiting, till the barren land
Fills with the dreadful monotone of rain.

Such verses, although part of a formal sonnet, can be taken as her private utterance. (In that year she published *In a German Pension*, her earliest and gayest set of tales). The beauty of the stories is their objectivity. They belong, not to a mind performing solo aeronautics, but to the children, the women, sometimes the men who are in them. These move like living beings; but behind them, behind even their most personal secrets, something they do not know about is going on. This is where, in the triumphant stories, the gallons do go into the gill of cream. Consider those Daughters of the Late Colonel, timid, cowed, afraid even to insult the tyrannical corpse by stowing it in a coffin. They are unaware, as *we* are made aware, that they stand for a whole system of "Colonial" domination and the rigidly negative training of young women to be cyphers and servitors. Freedom comes too late. They want—they know not what. There are clues in the image of Buddha, in the sparrows whose cries, "so weak and forlorn", are *inside* Josephine. There is in Constantia a child's romantic dream of sea and storm and moonlight like a Claude Lorrain, never destroyed by wisdom and maturity. Something is frightfully important, but in the end both sisters have forgotten what they were trying to articulate, or, after all those tethered years, they are too shy to say it.

Two briefer stories hold these overtones conspicuously. "The Fly" appears to start with the ironic debunking that delighted Shaw and became in the Aldous Huxley of the 'twenties a form of analytic torture. The boss, whose son was killed six years ago, "wanted, he intended, he had arranged to weep"—and couldn't. He sees himself looking round and about the pinpoint of his mourning with a sort of midday disillusionment. Then comes the fly, like some selected Job amongst lepidoptera, fighting the onslaughts of an inky fate. The suffering boss, turned God of persecutions, admires the little fellow's pluck, gives it one test too many with his ink-blob, and the creature dies. The reverberations of this tale are almost endless, and though the boss is blind to them he too is an object of sympathy and not contempt. "Honeymoon" is simpler: Fanny, so ecstatically happy on the French Riviera with her wooden but awfully decent George, is deeply worried by the quavering old man who sings for his meagre living at the café. What Fanny sees is the cruelty of life that to her was only pleasure. What the reader sees, through their respective attitudes to the singer, is that George and Fanny are poles apart, and the suffering that to Fanny is a cool acquaintance will be intimately hers one day. Here is the perfection of Katherine Mansfield's method—

the whole course of a marriage contained in a single hour.

It is part of her unavoidable artistic burden that truth must always be sheathed in suffering. She accepted that with courage and went to meet it—like Fanny, doubting her right, now, to be so happy on that gorgeous coast. So Bertha, in *Bliss*, is astonished that the pear tree was still flowering when she knew her husband loved Miss Fulton. And so Laura, contrasting the pleasures of her garden party with the back-street accident of a labourer's death, could find him "wonderful—beautiful. While they were laughing and while the band was playing, this marvel had come to the lane." Her characters find, in the discovery of earth's misery, something approaching the sublime. Here is her justification and—when the miracle works—her triumph. Other writers, other orderings. But for Katherine Mansfield, to spread out, if her potential stretch could allow of it, and gather in hunks of miscellaneous activity, would be too much like gaining the entire world except its soul. She could revolt for a while, writing in a letter ten days before her death: "I want to be much more material, I am tired of my little stories like birds bred in cages." It was a whim; the birds were there unfledged, but singing inside her with the sparrows of Josephine. Some fifteen of her undeveloped beginnings were published in 1923. They are not of necessity lost masterpieces, but their ghostly outlines seem to hover in an aura round her clear achievement, adding their assurance that *this*—take it or leave it—was the Mansfield way. The quarter-century has gone by, and Europe has taken it.

CORRESPONDENCE

"BRITAIN AND AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA"

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

Mr. Jack Chen's political sympathies are so evident that no reader can have been unable to allow for them in estimating the weight of his article in the February number of THE FORTNIGHTLY. But the article contains important mis-statements and omissions which should be pointed out to those not closely acquainted with Far Eastern affairs.

Regarding Russia's persistent refusal to allow Chinese troops to be stationed in Port Arthur and Dairen, Mr. Chen says:

... the Soviet authorities have stood pat on their treaty rights which entrust the defence of Port Arthur to them and also of Dairen during the term of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and while a state of war exists with Japan—that is, until a peace treaty with Japan is signed.

It is surely rather childish to talk of "defending" Port Arthur and Dairen more than two years after Japan's defeat. But in any case there is nothing in the treaty which gives Russia the exclusive defence of these ports, nothing which forbids Chinese troops to be stationed in them. Dairen is declared to be a free port under Chinese administration, Port Arthur to be a naval base for the "joint use" of both countries. Russia's violation of the treaty in both these respects has been continually protested against by the Chinese Government, but without effect.

"No difficulties," says Mr. Chen, "have been put in the way of establishment of

civilian Chinese administration at these places." This is simply not true. In May, or June, last year, after prolonged representations to Moscow, the Soviet Government gave permission for a Chinese Mission to be sent to Dairen to prepare for the restoration here of Chinese administration. But on its arrival the local Russian Command put so much obstruction in the way of the Mission that it was obliged to leave with nothing accomplished. This position is still unaltered.

Incidentally, in December 1946 three American business men in an American ship were refused entry into Dairen by the Russians and the ship was told to leave the port. No other foreign merchants, I believe, have since tried to enter Dairen.

On p. 90 (*THE FORTNIGHTLY* : February) Mr. Chen refers to the "settlement . . . reached at the All-Party Political Consultative Conference of January 1946," but carefully omits details. At the P.C.C. General Chiang Kai-shek conceded practically every demand made by the communists; and at a meeting of the Kuomintang Congress a few days later he obtained the endorsement of these concessions by an overwhelming majority. In the forming of the Coalition Government last April eleven places were left open for the communists and Democratic League which, if accepted, would have put the Kuomintang members in a minority; and throughout 1946 and the first half of 1947 General Chiang in many public addresses begged the communists to stand by the P.C.C. settlement (which they had nominally accepted), enter the Government and co-operate with others for the good of China. Whatever else General Chiang may be and those who know him personally are disgusted by the communists' vile abuse of him he is no hypocrite. It was not until he realized (as General Marshall stressed in his farewell report) that the communists did not want peace, that he started military operations against them on a considerable scale.

Mr. Chen lays stress on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria in 1946. He omits to mention (a) that by then Russia had stripped Manchuria of £181,000,000 worth of Japanese machinery; (b) that in withdrawing from each town the Russians waited four or five days before notifying the Chinese Government Commanders, thus enabling the communists to get in first. What other help Russia has or has not given the Chinese communists is only known to them. But it is certainly not straining probabilities to suggest that one reason for Russia's exclusive grip on Dairen is the presence in the neighbourhood of Chinese communist troops which are passed through the port to fight in Shantung.

Yours faithfully,

O. M. GREEN.

Virginia Water.

Mr. Jack Chen replies :

If my recent article did not make evident my political sympathy for democracy, then indeed it would have failed of its purpose. As regards its weight, I note that Mr. Green makes no criticism of its main thesis—which, on the basis of the facts, is unanswerable—namely, that large scale American intervention has been going on in China, that there is a danger that it may be intensified and that Britain may be embroiled in it to her own disadvantage and that of democracy.

Perhaps it is characteristic of the times that in failing to challenge this thesis, Mr. Green endeavours to shift the discussion to—Soviet Russia. I was dealing mainly with American policy otherwise I might have dealt at length with the question of Dairen or perhaps raised the question of Hong Kong and the use of this port to supply General Chiang's armies, or the training in the British Fleet of Kuomintang naval personnel who are being used in the civil war against the Chinese democrats. I might have mentioned the 160,000,000 dollars of arms and supplies being sent to General Chiang from Canada, and much else. However, in view of the primary significance of American intervention, these are subsidiary issues. But then I might have mentioned also the protection afforded by Hong Kong to the democratic leaders who have had to flee from General

Chiang Kai-shek or the efficient Chinese civilian administration of Dairen headed by a non-communist, Mr. Chih Tso-hsiang. It is common knowledge that the Chiang mission wanted to bring its troops into Dairen to turn it into a base of operations against the liberated areas (not to mention the Russians) and for other purposes only too clearly known from the twenty years of experience of Kuomintang misrule. Quite apart from this, the Russians are well within the rights granted to them in the Treaty signed by the Kuomintang government.

The American businessmen mentioned were one Standard Oil man and two press correspondents, all without proper landing papers, who arrived in a U.S. naval vessel. This "incident" was staged for provocative purposes as every newspaperman in Shanghai knew at the time.

If I had gone into details of the P.C.C. Settlement it would have provided stronger evidence of General Chiang Kai-shek's hypocrisy. It was not a communist but an American professor, Mr. Nathaniel Pfeffer, who said: "The present government of China is the worst Chinese government in modern times, one of the worst in the world to-day—worse in point of incompetence, corruption, spoliation, quasi-fascist repression and lack of decency of purpose." Mr. Harold Ickes described him "as ruthless, cruel and treacherous a dictator as ever wielded despotic power." Mr. Henry L. Stimson characterized him as an "ignorant, suspicious, feudal autocrat." Mr. Marshall in fact criticized "the dominant group of reactionaries in the Kuomintang" (and General Chiang leads these reactionaries), who "were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue" while they "have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their action." General Chiang Kai-shek indeed rushed into a civil war he thought he could win, and captured 141 towns before the tide was turned.

It is true, I did not mention that the Russians took Japanese machinery from Manchuria. This fact is generally known and admitted, though Mr. Green's figure is purely hypothetical, but I also "omitted" mention of the vast destruction to China resulting from American intervention. In Harbin the Kuomintang established an administration with troops while the Russians were still in occupation, also in Changchun and other centres. If the Manchurian Resistance forces entered other places before the Kuomintang as the Russians left that was surely no fault of the Russians. The Kuomintang troops were too far away. Surely Mr. Green did not expect the Russians to hold these places until the Kuomintang troops fought their way in? At that rate they would still be in occupation of Harbin and Tsitsihar and most other Northern towns.

No evidence of course has ever been advanced to support rumours of Russian aid to Chinese communists in Dairen or elsewhere. The only party that has received Soviet aid is none other than General Chiang Kai-shek when he led the Kuomintang armies against the "legitimate" Peiping government in 1926 and again when he received some 300 million dollars of Moscow gold to stiffen his resolution against the Japanese invaders in the late war.

SIR HENRY SLESSER and *The First Europe*.

The Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

There is a sentence in Sir Henry Slessor's review of Dr. Burns's volume *The First Europe*, in the March number of THE FORTNIGHTLY, which may easily cause misunderstanding. Sir Henry writes: "Christopher Dawson alone sees in this period the foundation of . . . medieval Catholic Christianity." Surely the purpose of Dr. Burns, explicitly avowed in the Introduction, was to emphasize that very fact, and to insist that during the period (400-800 A.D.) that society was being shaped in which, to quote Dr. Burns's own words, "everyone was assumed to be Christian and Catholic."

Yours faithfully,

B. C. PLOWRIGHT.

Beckenham.

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THE AGE OF RESPONSIBILITY

BY JOHN ARMITAGE

ONE of the advantages we may hope to gain from the five-Power union in the west—once we have accepted as temporarily inevitable the tragic disadvantage of a divided Europe—is the much closer co-operation between men and women in the five countries who are working on similar sociological problems. Article II of the Five-Power Treaty gives promise of this by saying that the High Contracting Parties will “develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.” Article III supports this promise with its declaration that every effort will be made to lead the peoples “towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges.”

With these Articles of the Five-Power Treaty in mind it is encouraging to note an example of what could be done given in a recent book.* *Lawless Youth* outlines a policy for the juvenile courts and was prepared by the International Committee of the Howard League for Penal Reform. As Miss Margery Fry tells us in the opening chapter the publication was “the outcome of a series of meetings of a Committee of men and women of thirteen nationalities brought together in London by the fortunes—or misfortunes—of war.” Perhaps the members of that committee, though well versed in the legal systems of their countries, were not all specialists on juvenile delinquency and on other children in need of care; nevertheless an excellent job of work was done, a most interesting book produced and, most important of all, a clear indication given of how much swifter progress might be if we would only study and profit by the experiments, successes and mistakes of others.

In the five western European countries of the union—with others, we hope, later to be added—consultation and collaboration should now be practicable. All five have a big problem of juvenile delinquency and the care of children, orphaned or neglected, largely as the result of war. Although the national traditions of approach and methods of treatment differ in detail, none is sacrosanct. (Except, of course, our dual system of State and voluntary Homes and our unpaid lay magistrates, whose existence shocks, according to *Lawless Youth*, legally minded people from other lands.) What is plain, from the wealth of intelligence in this book, is that there is a broad sympathy of aim, which may be summed up in M. Grünhut's words, “to present the prevention of juvenile delinquency as a social and educational concern, and to substitute for retribution and punishment the offender's corrective training and rehabilitation.” With this as the object it should not be impossible for the five nations to advance in step, although we know that the most useful prevention would be the restoration of the stability of the home from which the child came, if this were possible.

Two plans are needed, one to meet the present situation, which as the result of war is worse on the Continent of Europe than it is at home and the other, long-term. With part of the present problem, the Lord Mayor of London's United Nations Appeal for Children will be able to help by providing food, medical supplies, clothing and educational equipment but with the other part, the actual homelessness and delinquency, and

* *Lawless Youth, A Challenge to the New Europe*, by Margery Fry, M. Grünhut, Hermann Mannheim, Wanda Grabinska and C. D. Rackham. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

the long-term plan there is need for expert collaboration.

One point which seems ripe for decision is the establishment of an age of responsibility. In M. Grünhut's article in *Lawless Youth* it is stated that "as far as juvenile offenders in the legal sense are concerned, the lower age-limit varies from 8 in England to 15 in Denmark and Sweden, the higher age-limit from 16 in England to 18 in certain Continental countries." The discrepancy is not, perhaps, as great as it appears for what is really at stake is whether there should be, in addition to a court, a quite separate tribunal for those children who are not presumed to have reached the age of criminal responsibility and at what age the jurisdiction of such a tribunal should stop. As it is, in this country a child under fourteen, though appearing before a juvenile court is presumed *doli incapax*, unless he is proved otherwise, and children who have not committed an offence but are in need of protection also appear on occasions in the juvenile court.

The movement now is towards considering all children under a certain age as in need of care and protection and not as criminals, since it has long been accepted that children who reach the court as in need of care are often more disturbed and difficult than those who have committed an offence. We recognize this by committing some children in need of care to the same approved schools as those attended by delinquents.

So the questions are: at what age should a child be expected to accept criminal responsibility for his actions and should children under that age be removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts? Answers vary but at least there is to-day sound evidence for suggesting sixteen—the eventual compulsory school age provided for in the Education Act 1944—as the age-limit for treating children as in need of care rather than as delinquents, though the further idea of providing for them a special welfare tribunal may not appeal. On the whole our juvenile courts have developed well with the right amount of severity tempered by the understanding demanded by the age of the child. Because a child were not regarded as criminally responsible up to sixteen would not argue that he should look upon himself as someone who was in no way responsible for his actions. Moreover, now that the Children's Branch of the Home Office is rightly regarded as the custodian of homeless children as well as delinquents, it is proper that we should continue to enhance the prestige of the courts by developing the positive as against the punitive side of their work.

DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE, 1938-9,
by Professor L. B. Namier. *Macmillan*.
18s.

"The issue of a crisis," writes Professor Namier, "depends not so much on its magnitude as on the courage and resolution with which it is met." Intended as a statement of the lessons to be learnt from Munich, these words may also be read as an expression of the spirit in which Professor Namier has compiled this masterly account of the diplomatic negotiations between the European Powers from September 29, 1938, to September 3, 1939. His knowledge of the national and political backgrounds of the countries with which he is concerned, his friendship with many of the leading statesmen of whom he writes, his style

which combines the lucidity of Thucydides with the sparkle of Macaulay—these are, indeed, invaluable assets. But it may well be doubted whether he would have completed the task to which he set himself in 1940, had he lacked the courage and resolution to re-write and re-shape in 1945 and 1946 much of the material which he had already published in a series of articles in the *Political Quarterly*.

To the material with which he was originally concerned, there were added at a later date the documents offered in evidence at the Nuremberg Trial, the reports of press correspondents, statements in Parliament, and the information garnered in conversation with exiled statesmen. New wine had, as he says, "to be carefully infused into old bottles"

but these bottles would not hold it all. The result is the addition of a section entitled "Episodes and Men", the purpose of which is "to provide packing space for matter complementary to this book, but which could not be incorporated in it."

It is, of course, unfortunate—although in present circumstances, inevitable—that two years should have elapsed between the completion and the publication of this study. In the interval much new evidence has become available, some of it useful in supplementing the earlier collections of official documents on which Professor Namier commenced work. The British Blue Book is almost wholly concerned with the last ten days before the declaration of war. The French Yellow Book was "severely cut and pruned before publication". Both the German and Polish White Books were intended to be propagandist. It is Professor Namier's success in correlating these incomplete records with the official and unofficial evidence which became available both before and after the Nuremberg Trial which gives to his study a unity which it might otherwise have easily lacked.

Nevertheless, it is not always possible, on the evidence submitted, to accept Professor Namier's judgments and opinions. The failure of pre-war diplomacy was, in his view, the failure of Neville Chamberlain and his colleagues to achieve an alliance with Soviet Russia. It may be, as he suggests, that the tragic inevitability of the months he surveys could have been avoided by the overthrow in the 'thirties of the Versailles agreement which only made possible the continued existence of Poland on the basis of German-Russian tension; but his unconcealed contempt for the policy pursued by British and French statesmen in the period between the wars hardly lends conviction to his argument.

JOHN MACKAY-MURE.

AUSTRIAN REQUIEM, by Kurt von Schuschnigg. *Gollancz*. 7s. 6d.

Pre-war Austria was the fore-ordained

victim of that graceless period of "appeasement" which led up to the ordeal by battle of the great powers. To-day, with the war of documents now being waged about responsibilities for that grisly culmination, it is useful to have an opportunity of re-focussing our vision of the prelude. Dr. Schuschnigg's evocation of his unhappy summons to Berchtesgaden and the aftermath (which he recounts in detail) is illuminating, and the story is a moving one. This slice of history in Book I, and the accompanying sketch of Austria's foreign relations during the preceding period, constitutes the political substance of Dr. Schuschnigg's apologia.

Because Austria was to all intents and purposes a ward in chancery of the European Great Powers, her fate was sealed when in 1936 the international power-balance shifted. The Berlin-Rome Axis was Dr. Schuschnigg's political death-warrant—and he knew it. Pressure at home, however, in any case compelled him to contrive a public agreement with Germany—namely the *modus vivendi* of July 11, 1936: pressure not so much from the actual National-Socialist Party in Austria (which was never really important) but from the large number of Austrians who, because they felt themselves to be, after all, Germans by history and tradition, hankered still after some sort of *Anschluss*.

The rest of the book is a very human document in diary form describing the author's seven years of confinement, for three years alone, thereafter in the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen and other prison camps, waiting for a trial by People's Court which never came off. In the last two months of the war he found himself with M. and Mme. Blum, Dr. Schacht and various German generals in disgrace who displayed a "bottomless hatred and contempt for the strategy and the methods of the Führer's headquarters." Finally there is a juicy appendix of the actual transcripts of telephone conversations between Berlin and other capitals at the time of the occupation of Austria.

WILLIAM RYDAL.

THE AWAKENING OF MODERN EGYPT, by M. Rifaat bey. *Longmans.* 15s.

SYRIAN PAGEANT, by Wilfrid T. F. Castle. *Hutchinson.* 21s.

It is a refreshing and enlightening experience to read *The Awakening of Modern Egypt*. Egyptian history has hitherto been almost exclusively written by non-Egyptians. Now for the first time we can follow the story of modern Egypt through Rifaat bey's virile, scholarly and accurate Egyptian eyes.

Its high interest lies in the personalities of Mohamed Aly "the Great" and his grandson, Ismail Pasha "the Magnificent." Both in their different ways did much which ultimately if not immediately was to contribute towards the moulding of Modern Egypt. Both were international as well as Egyptian figures. Both had highly sympathetic sides to their characters. But Rifaat bey has not been blind to their complementary failings. His account of the almost pathetic stagnation of Mohamed Aly's expansionist and domestic policies after 1940 is told with courage and discrimination. Equally downright is the description of the dilemma into which Ismail Pasha fell because he had no idea of cutting his cloth to suit his measure.

One chapter, "The Leap into the Dark Continent", is of special interest to-day. Ismail Pasha, like Mohamed Aly, had expansionist ambitions; but profiting from his grandfather's experiences, he eschewed the Levant and Europe and turned his eyes southwards into Africa. In 1868 a chance conversation with King Edward VII—then Prince of Wales—gave him the meritorious idea of Sir Samuel Baker's Mission to civilize primitive Africa and to stamp out slavery; but he linked this idea with his own less meritorious instincts which were essentially aggressive and imperialist. The result was a huge, flimsy, ephemeral Egyptian Empire, the terrific cost of which contributed fatally to Ismail's downfall.

In his concluding chapters Rifaat bey

deals with Orati Pasha's rebellion and the Cromerian régime from a strictly Egyptian standpoint. His story is revealing. He does not mince his words in his criticism of Orabi and he is generous in his appreciation of Lord Cromer's achievement for Egypt.

It is good to know that we may look forward to the second volume which Rifaat bey is preparing to cover the reigns of King Fuad and King Farouk and the making of Independent Egypt.

Syrian Pageant is an equally well-timed book. It covers no less than three thousand kaleidoscopic years of normally bewildering history; but in tracing the rise and fall in Syria of Empire after Empire down to the present day, there is a chronological coherence or thoroughness throughout which is easy and exciting to follow; and Mr. Castle's scholarly and intriguing narrative never descends to the unhappy level of "potted history" or to the sterility of a handbook.

The accounts of successive Jewish régimes in Jerusalem have particular topical interest at the present time especially the rarely told history of the Maccabean interlude (B.C. 166 to B.C. 63) with its heroic beginnings and sad and sordid end.

Mr. Castle has achieved for Syrian history what Mr. Seton Lloyd has done for Iraq in his *Twin Rivers*. That is real praise and Mr. Castle deserves it.

OWEN TWEEDY.

FRANCE : a short history, by Albert Guérard. *Allen and Unwin.* 8s. 6d.

Professor Guérard holds the chair of literature at Stanford University. He has spent forty years in American Universities, teaching the history of France. His convictions are summed up in this book, which he calls his testament.

It is therefore primarily an expression of his faith in his country, and of his belief that reverses lead it to further endeavour and greater attainment. On occasion, his enthusiasm produces an idealized or over-simplified picture.

The first thirty pages of his book are

full of illuminating comments on the character of the French nation, and its contribution to the European inheritance. It is only when France has sought refuge in isolation, or "sacred egoism", that her sense of mission has been obscured, to her own detriment and the world's loss.

After describing the geographical conditions of France, Professor Guérard gives an interesting account of the structure of society in medieval times. He shows the two exaggerated conceptions of the Middle Ages, the one representing it as a period of Gothic darkness, the other as a vanished Utopia. He makes it evident that the feudal "system" was far more incoherent than the word itself suggests.

The chapters on the consolidation of France under Henri IV, Richelieu and Louis XIV are among his most vivid and picturesque pages, with lively character sketches of the leading personalities. Professor Guérard makes some interesting comparisons between the opportunities for advancement which talented men of the *bourgeois* class enjoyed under Louis XIV, with the obstacles and frustrations that they encountered in the two subsequent reigns.

In other respects, however, these chapters are inadequate: they do not give a sufficient account of the social conditions of the mass of the population or of the general economic state of the nation. The influence of the salons, either in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, is only mentioned in a cursory way. There are, unfortunately, too many occasions when more information or explanation is required to make the narrative complete. Professor Guérard describes some of the features of the intellectual background of the eighteenth century, but he omits others of equal importance. He has little to say about the penetration of foreign thought into France; he provides singularly little close analysis of the social and political discords of the last 150 years.

His treatment of famous men is often

perfunctory; Turenne, Turgot, Danton, Talleyrand and Pasteur are scarcely more than names. Even Napoleon remains a shadowy figure and there is practically nothing to explain why he won a battle or inspired a nation. On the other hand, Napoleon III is discussed at some length, and treated with considerable indulgence.

Professor Guérard's account of modern times is sometimes open to the same criticisms. He gives an interesting description of France's internal recovery after the first world war, but he somewhat obscures the issue by representing her foreign policy as completely subservient to that of England, during the years of the dictators. His picture of the unity of France after the Liberation is again one that needs to be given more light and shade. His final chapter—perhaps one of his best—is concerned with the development of the French Empire, and various forms of colonization from the days of the Normans onwards.

CHARLES GOULD.

THE ATLANTIC ISLANDS: The Faeroe Life and Scene, by Kenneth Williamson. *Collins*. 16s.

So many excellent books with a leaning towards topography and natural history have been produced in recent years, that it is particularly welcome to find one dealing with a part of the world which has so far been cavalierly treated, at any rate in the English language. As Mr. Linklater suggests in his foreword, Mr. Kenneth Williamson has supplied a want which has waited for fulfilment.

The Atlantic Islands seems a rather too general title for a book which deals with only one group of the isles in that ocean; especially as Mr. Williamson's book can quite frankly be described as one of the most satisfying volumes of its kind that has appeared for some time past. It is satisfying both as a portrayal of its subject and as a corrective to the *accidie* which is outstanding among the failings of the present-day Englishman.

Reports from troops stationed in the

Faeroes during the late war indicated that there was a continual complaint of "having nothing to do". Mr. Williamson proves how unwarranted this was, and in the course of his four years of military service he managed to find out most of the many things that can be done in the Faeroes. He has described them in a way which is fascinating to the general reader and tantalizing to the ornithologist and the ethnologist, both of whom will feel sure that the author has a great deal more to say on the ways of birds and men than he has included in the present book.

Unlike many writers with a scientific outlook, Mr. Williamson never forgets to be human; his Faeroe men and women are not mere units, they are real individuals (and a very charming collection, too). Their history is heroic: apart altogether from the hazards of fishing and fowling, the men risked their lives to bring fish to Britain during the war; no Briton can read without a thrill of gratitude that the Faeroemen were responsible for seventy-five per cent. of the fish that reached our shores in the dread spring of 1941, or that the Faeroes sacrificed more men in proportion to their population than any of the fighting powers. It is some satisfaction to know that it was on the suggestion of the Royal Navy that Faeroe ships first flew the island flag—a privilege never permitted by Denmark.

The description of the *grindadráp*, the mass slaughter of caaing-whales in the Faeroe bays, is bound to be the most notorious chapter of the book; but it is indeed "a sordid and sanguinary job of work," and Mr. Williamson is right in insisting that, with all due allowance for the excitement of the hunt, the main objective is the provision of food in a land unblest with the customary bounty of nature. Bird-fowling, too, carried out with great skill and no little risk, is quite distinctly a matter of hunting for the pot. But farming is the main occupation of the Faeroe people. Although volcanic geography and a highly oceanic climate allow only a few

acres of soil to be worked, the energy and ingenuity which the Faeroese put into their farming and stockbreeding are an example to some of our own remoter islanders, who make great complaint under much less unfavourable conditions.

Should the reader wish to know about the system of land-tenure, the presence or absence of bees, the local method of constructing a water-mill, or whether there is an opening for an enterprising wheelwright in the Faeroes, his curiosity will be satisfied. This is a rare and refreshing account of a highly-civilized community still sufficiently remote from the main streams to have retained its individuality intact.

The "trimmings"—indexes, appendices, glossary, and even chapter-headings—are arranged in the most convenient way possible.

L. RUSSELL MUIRHEAD.

INSIDE U.S.A., by John Gunther.
Hamish Hamilton. 21s.

The American elections of 1948 will, from the average Englishman's point of view, be the worst reported elections of modern times. The four-page newspaper, struggling to enfold in its skimpy embraces the manifold complexities of the contemporary world, cannot hope to do more than give the barest outlines of a contest whose duration and convolutions, even in more spacious days, taxed the skill of correspondents and sub-editors to the utmost. Even the lordlier organs of the twopenny and threepenny press will have to simplify, select and compress to a degree which will leave their readers only half aware of the diverse issues and intricate manoeuvres that lie behind the deceptive simplicities of nominations and elections.

But fortunately, like an American food parcel arriving to supplement the week's bare rations, Mr. Gunther's *Inside U.S.A.* is available (or was—you'd better hurry) with just the kind of up-to-date, detailed and intelligible information on candidates and issues which will make the bare bones of newspaper despatches

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come alive. Politics bring their surprises to everyone, even Mr. Gunther, but 1948 will be indeed a "year of revolutions" if it brings men or movements into the election campaign which have escaped the haul of his wide net.

It is not, however, in this obvious and narrow sense alone that Mr. Gunther's pages constitute the ideal companion to the elections. The campaign will be fought against the background of the astonishing diversity of the United States. In a sense American elections are always re-affirmations of unity in difference, the contest for the presidency in particular a kind of political polyphony which culminates in a great C Major chord of national self-determination. To a comprehension of this process an appreciation of the diversities is no less necessary than a realization of the unities—and the former, from a distance of 3,000 miles is very much harder to obtain. Distance lends a deceptive enchantment to the American view. The great merit of Mr. Gunther's book, over-riding all its other virtues (and they are very many) is its faithfulness to what he calls the "mixedupedness" of the United States. It is this "mixedupedness" which baffles and frustrates so many would-be chroniclers, leading them to search desperately for ever wilder categories of interpretation, devising increasingly brutal strait-jackets of abstraction to contain a vitality which they have mistaken for abnormality.

Mr. Gunther, of course, has some questions which he would like answered, but they are practical questions, like "Who runs Kansas?" or "Who bosses Boss Crump?"; the cosmic overtones are noted down if they become clamorous but they are never allowed to get in the way of a straight record of things seen, heard or experienced. *Inside U.S.A.* is keen, lively, intelligent, honest reporting. If you want to know what the U.S.A. is like, it is like this—as large, as varied, as vital, as amusing. I do not know where else you could begin to get a comparably accurate portrayal.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

LATER VICTORIAN CAMBRIDGE,
by D. A. Winstanley. *Cambridge University Press.* 25s.

It is unlikely that D. A. Winstanley's reputation as the historian of certain aspects of Cambridge will be surpassed. Winstanley combined the mind of a scholar with the experience of a man of affairs, and a quiet wit pervades his writing. His first works dealt with the political history of the eighteenth century, and were distinguished for accuracy of scholarship and originality of research. Largely concerned with the Duke of Newcastle, who was at the time Chancellor of the University, his mid-eighteenth century studies were the starting point for his work as a University historian.

The present book, published posthumously, completed the task the author had set himself, to record the history of the University from the eighteenth century down to the statutes of 1882. Few who are not already familiar with his story will realize the Vice-Chancellor's power over persons who were not members of the University, even to the extent of committing to the "Spinning House" a young woman charged with "walking with a member of the University in a public street in the Town of Cambridge." The whole story of Daisy Hopkins, the "venomous and bitter" feeling of the town, even the anonymous postcard to the Vice-Chancellor, signed "Tit-for-Tat", are admirable material for Winstanley and show him at his best.

Quite apart from this anyone who might think the history of a University to be appropriate only to the pen of a Dr. Dryasdust, need only read the opening chapter on "Robinson's Vote." This tells of the election of C. K. Robinson to the Mastership of St. Catharine's and of the rumours that he had obtained the office improperly—in fact by voting for himself when he had promised to vote for his rival. Such a slender plot may not suggest a very interesting story, but the research imposed by the difficulties of conflicting

evidence has rewarded the author with an insight into the characters of the principal actors.

There is nothing dull in the book, and the chapters on the effects of the religious Tests and the movement to bring about their abolition, and on the rights and wrongs of the reception of the Judges at Trinity College are rewarding.

Of greatest interest perhaps is the chapter on educational reform between 1860 and 1880. Here the death of ancient prejudices was a lingering one, and it was not without a struggle that "the long-cherished superstition that mathematics and classics alone gave a liberal education gradually receded into the background and studies, hitherto unrecognized or despised, obtained an honoured place."

The book is a worthy successor of its predecessors—*Unreformed Cambridge* and *Early Victorian Cambridge*, and with them forms a single work.

J. F. BURNET.

THE LAW OF THE PRESS, by Thomas Dawson. *Staples Press*. 20s.

This book deserves a hearty welcome from those who are occupied in any work or transaction connected with the press and who wish for advice on the rights and duties conferred or imposed upon them by the law. As the learned author says, it is intended primarily for writers, publishers, printers and others concerned in the production and dissemination of printed matter; but he hopes that it may also be of some use to members of the legal profession as a digest of the law of the press, and his hope is fulfilled.

All the legal problems that may confront the press are considered—the law of libel, of copyright, of contracts for printing and publishing, of advertisements, of elections, of imprints, of newspaper regulations and posting regulations. These topics are preceded by an attractive introductory chapter on the history of the law relating to the press.

I venture to make a few suggestions on the law of libel for the next edition.

On page 40, in the paragraph numbered 2, it is stated that the "report (of a public meeting) must be of public concern or published for the public benefit." My impression of the law is that "and" should be substituted for "or". In explaining fair comment, the author cites a *dictum* of Lord Esher in *Merivale v. Carson*: "The question which the jury must consider is this: Would any fair man, however exaggerated or obstinate his views, have said that which this criticism has said?" Elsewhere, I have criticized this odd description of "fairness". In the account of law relating to libel on a class of people, it might be worth while to cite the latest authority, the decision of the House of Lords in *Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd.* (1944) A.C. 116. In the law on "Indemnities to printers" it should be noted that the plaintiffs in *W. H. Smith & Son v. Clinton & Harris*, knew that the matter they printed was libellous, and it may be inferred that that was why they could not enforce a contract of indemnity against the proprietor of the paper. Further, I see nothing in the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1934, which was passed subsequently to the decision, that would prevent recovery on such a contract by printers who neither knew, nor could reasonably have been expected to know, that the matter was libellous.

These suggestions in no way diminish my high opinion of the book and the belief that it deserves, and will have, a very wide circulation.

P. H. WINFIELD.

FRIENDS AMBULANCE UNIT, by A. Tegla Davies. *Allen and Unwin*. 15s.

The young men and women members of the Friends Ambulance Unit who saw service between 1939 and 1946 in twenty-five countries were all Quakers or "those who share Quaker views on peace and war." In all they numbered 1,300, or two per cent. of the conscientious objectors of the war, so that the size of the teams in any theatre of operations was necessarily very small.

Realizing this, the reader is all the more likely to be astonished at the extent of the activities of the Unit and the variety of the tasks it undertook. Accounts of work in the battle areas cover Finland and Norway, Egypt, Greece, the North African Campaign with the British Army and the Hadfield Spears Hospital Unit; from Alamein to Germany (this time with the British and the Fighting French), Burma, London and other home cities in the blitz; and they range from casualty clearance in the front line to the organization of medical stores at base. Other chapters tell of the Unit in Syria and Ethiopia, with the International Red Cross in China, and in India.

While hospitals, clinics, education and relief were occupying the Unit in three continents, members at home were working and training in over eighty hospitals, doing relief and social work, and serving as assistants and voluntary "guinea-pigs" for valuable and unpleasant medical research experiments. From September 1943 until the end of the war, civilian relief took the Unit's teams to Sicily and Italy, the Balkans, the Dodecanese, and Yugoslavia, and finally to North-Western Europe and Austria.

Mr. Davis states that his purpose is not to argue a religious or philosophic case, but to give an account of pacifism in action. His account, however, illuminates several of the problems which confront the pacifist serving with an army in the field or the unpaid worker to whose professional colleague the posts of responsibility for which they compete imply primarily more pay. Moreover, it provides testimony from both sides to a "commendable tolerance".

In nearly 500 pages Mr. Davies has not succeeded in overcoming all the difficulties which he admits faced him. Though apparently "requested as an 'official history'", the work will find its best audience in the members of the Unit. To the general reader there is a lack of cohesion in the arrangement, and an insistence on trivial and seemingly irrelevant details, which bewilder and often irritate. Some self-consciousness

is to be expected (though self-consciousness spoils a few of the otherwise excellent illustrations); but in seeking to be objective, Mr. Davies relies too much on passives and impersonals and abstractions which nearly stifle the occasional living phrase. It is a deadening artifice which mars a work in which there is much of lasting interest.

ROBIN BENN.

INDIAN SUMMER, by John Arlott.
Longmans, Green. 7s. 6d.

INTRODUCING SQUASH, by D. G. Butcher. *Faber and Faber.* 10s. 6d.

John Arlott, whose poems and reviews appear from time to time in the pages of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, brings, in *Indian Summer*, his descriptive talents to bear on cricket. Well known as a broadcaster on the game, Mr. Arlott watched most of the matches played by the Indian cricket team in 1946. A book about men as well as matches played, it will delight all followers of the game.

Another *FORTNIGHTLY* reviewer, Mr. J. F. Burnet, contributes a chapter on the well known Jesters Club, which he founded, to Mr. D. G. Butcher's book *Introducing Squash*. Mr. Butcher, who was for some years professional champion of this now deservedly popular game, has long enjoyed an enviable reputation as a coach. His book, therefore, will be widely welcomed. As a player he was famed for the artistry of his stroke play; as an instructor in his book the clarity of the text is well supported by many helpful diagrams.

J.A.

THE PROMETHEUS BOUND OF AESCHYLUS: A Translation by Rex Warner. *The Bodley Head.* 6s.

FROST AT MIDNIGHT: Poems by J. H. B. Peel. *Venturebooks Ltd.* 7s. 6d.

CHILDREN OF THE CENTURY: Ballads and Poems, by Alan Moray Williams *alias* "Robert the Rhymer". *Frederick Muller.* 6s.

In these days of almost universal "small Latin, and less Greek", hard

days moreover of moral doubt and bitter disorder, any new translation of the classics by an author of good standing is to be welcomed; especially is this so when the classic is the *Prometheus Bound* of Aeschylus which, as Mr. Warner himself tells us, is more than the story of Shelley's perfect hero, the romantic over-glorification of the rebel, but in the hands of this great dramatist is a "partial investigation into the problem of the injustice of life." And then on the purely technical side, as Mr. Cecil Day Lewis has stated it in a Foreword to his own translation of *The Georgics of Vergil*: "I believe that every classical poem worth translating should be translated afresh every fifty years. The contemporary poetic idiom, whether it be derived chiefly from common speech or a literary tradition, will have changed sufficiently within that period to demand a new interpretation." That is true, and Mr. Warner's version of *Prometheus Bound* appears in modern dress, clear, easy to read aloud, and as simple as the allegorical and prophetic quality in Aeschylus makes possible. For those who cannot read the original, it is in the quality of such works that some antidote to our present spiritual discontents might be found.

Mr. Peel and Mr. Williams both give the impression of being profoundly troubled men. In his new book of poems, *Frost at Midnight*, Mr. Peel, whose lyric gift at its best is as fresh as spring-water, holds to his heart his love of nature, withdrawn into his own privacy from what he detests in modern life, humble in his joys, aloof, often sad, sometimes defiant and proud. He is at his best perhaps in such lyrics as "Tomorrow":

They cut the hay tonight,
and in the waning light
it waits devoid of scent,
irrevocably rent;

but when I wake again
and wander in the lane
its fragrance will be born.
O hasten, lovely dawn.

I liked the poems "Written On Reading The Paston Letters", "Love's Bite", "Neighbours", "His Mirror", "The Great Divide" and "October Fields" with its slight echo of Tennyson:

With vigour now
the autumn plough
divides the harvest stubble
and leaves a sheen
where share has been
among the matted rubble.

Where Mr. Peel sings quietly of what he loves, Mr. Williams in *Children of the Century* would seem in many poems out to flay us with his message about what he hates. Well, he has written broad-sheets under the pseudonym of "Robert the Rhymer", and his book is dedicated to the memory of Rudyard Kipling, though of course he has neither Kipling's tone, mastery, nor punch. But he jumps right into the middle of the fray of modern life, and he is sincere. It may be said that Mr. Williams is clearly an idealist who glorifies the rebel:

But the rebel, the pebble
That's new to the beach,
The one who's "so serious";
The one you can't reach—
You'll abhor him, ignore him
And do nothing for him,
The saucy young upstart
Too knowing to teach!

One is left convinced that Mr. Williams wants a better world, but he is guilty in certain poems—"The X.Y.Z. Hotel" and "The Luckless Genteel"—of the inverted snobbery of the extreme left-winger. Yet he tries to be fair:

It's true the British poorer-paid
Have claims that long for justice cried—
Yet what fair-minded judge could say
All faults were on the Rich Man's side?

His social idealism finds expression in "Communal Restaurant":

Symbol of happier days to come,
A blueprint of a better world.

A part of the book contains eighteen interesting translations from the Russian.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

Plainly LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY by M. M. Lewis (*Nelson*, 12s. 6d.) is an important book. In a world which needs as never before a common speech and where the revival of nationalism induces the countries to cling to their own; where international communications have never been so complete and where the nations are further away than ever from understanding each other; where the language of diplomacy is synonymous with hypocrisy, and where speech is debased to a propaganda tool, such an analysis of what the author calls the "linguistic revolution" related to thought and action in and between societies is to be welcomed. Plainly, too, such a theme is fascinating—and Mr. Lewis handicaps himself by almost persuading the reader that it is dull. As a specialist naturally tends to use the terms of his speciality, allowances for this are duly made, but the ponderosities of style are surely uncalled for and, allied to this of all subjects, are a powerful deterrent. Nevertheless, in spite of pronouncements couched as follows:

In a word, what has been neglected is what we may call the social manipulative and declarative functions of the mother tongue: English as a means of promoting the more complex technical activities of the individual in a society, and of the integrative activities of the society itself—English as a means of social integration,

the reader should press on for the rewards which are hidden in the chapters on language in industry, warfare and politics, and on language and social integration and social conflict.

India speaks

Another medium through which understanding of world problems may be sought, is the "Teach Yourself History Library" (*English Universities Press*, 5s. each volume). The latest in the series is WARREN HASTINGS AND BRITISH INDIA by Penderel Moon. The career of an English "trading adventurer" who became the first Governor-General of India finds its parallel with that chapter in the history

of British dominion just closed. The author makes the affairs of the East India Company and the impeachment of Warren Hastings intensely interesting—which, for a pupil who could not be prodded into any genuine enthusiasm for empire, is more than history classes at school were able to do.—Pride in his heritage glows throughout Mohammad Yunus' FRONTIER SPEAKS (*Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay*, Rs. 4-8). This is the story of the North-West Frontier Province of India from 3000—2000 B.C. to the General Elections of January 1946. This book too is largely the history of the struggle of a region as exemplified in the biography of one man, the "Frontier Gandhi", Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, whose Preface states that the Province is so situated that it "will begin to play an important rôle not only in free India, but in free Asia." Pandit Nehru, in a balanced Foreword pays tribute to this borderland of India and to its war-like people who are becoming increasingly converted to the doctrine of non-violence. And both men, though not always in complete agreement with his views, commend the book and its author to readers, the British among whom will be disarmed by his apology: "Young that I am, I have not been able to curb the crudities of an emotional and youthful style."

Where people are content

Youthful too is the style of ESKIMO DOCTOR by Aage Gilberg (*Allen & Unwin*, 15s.) though a third of this might be because of Karin Elliott's translation. The other part is certainly due to the unquenchable fervour the Danish author has for North-Eastern Greenland where he went in 1938 to work among the Esquimaos as their doctor and friend. With his gift for compromise—witness old Moses who would puff his pipe in the ward and whose bed was moved to the corridor where he could smoke in peace, or the patient who was allowed to live in her tent outside the hospital—it is safe to

say that he was loved in return. He has much besides sickness and health to tell about; of seal and walrus hunting, of dog-sleigh tours over the glaciers and longer journeys across the ice to the far-northern settlements; and the illustrations testify to his skill with a camera. On their return to Copenhagen he and his wife were struck by the "unwillingness of people to help each other unless they received money, praise or glory for it," the claiming of more from the community than is contributed to it—characteristics they had forgotten while with the Polar Esquimos who "live as their good consciences tell them."

The golden mean

These mentors guided for the most part the owners of the portraits in A NORFOLK GALLERY, by R. W. Ketton-Cremer (*Faber & Faber*, 21s.). Many of them lived during the Civil War, when "lower case" liberals were caught and crushed between King and Parliament. Such a one was Bishop Hall, who gained his appointment to Norwich because of his tolerance towards Puritanism, and found it strongly entrenched in his new diocese. But he was not allowed to enjoy the fruits of popularity for long, and some of the indignities and deprivations he suffered smell like present-day witch huntings. On the other hand, the chapter entitled "The County Election of 1806" should impel both 'lower' and 'upper' case liberals to reflect thankfully that with the secret vote, the spread of the franchise, the ending of abuse and coercion at the poll, English democracy in one of its facets at least has proved to be the better part. Other portraits in this pleasing exhibition are of Sir Hamon L'Estrange and his sons, Robert Marsham, Humphry Repton and the Earl of Orford.—To counter the excesses of Puritanism, a quotation from Coventry Patmore's letters to Robert Bridges, published in the March number of THE FORTNIGHTLY, may be cited:

Gerard Hopkins was the only... saintly man in whom religion had absolutely no narrow-

ing effect upon his general opinions and sympathies.

This verdict is now endorsed and amplified by Eleanor Ruggles in GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS (*John Lane The Bodley Head*, 10s. 6d.), an impressive piece of work. Hopkins' circle of admirers is still restricted and his life comparatively unknown and the search (hinted at by the eight pages of bibliography), nearly sixty years after his death, for the biographical material of this Jesuit priest and poet with an obsession for privacy must have been exhausting. In recounting the extraordinary refusals of Hopkins to publish his work and his committal of the bulk of it to Robert Bridges, who edited and released it in 1918, the author pays graceful tribute: "Bridges was to fulfil his trust with a felicity and a success that Hopkins in his lifetime could never have commanded."

Oh to be in England—then

When Hopkins died Ford Madox Hueffer, the subject of THE LAST PRERAPHAELITE, by Douglas Goldring (*Macdonald*, 15s.) was sixteen years old, and just about to enter the 'nineties. He emerged apparently uninfluenced by any of the literary manifestations of the period. Yet, as the first editor of the *English Review*, he was able to show a list of contributors for the opening number in 1908 which quite properly awed the young sub-editor, who says "the thrill is still easily recalled", and who now writes Hueffer's biography. Among them were Hardy, Henry James, Conrad, Galsworthy, W. H. Hudson, Wells, W. H. Davies and Henry Nevinson. Mr. Goldring presents his old chief's complex personality affectionately but always objectively and gives only enough of his matrimonial and financial troubles to fill in the background. It is inevitable that such friends as Conrad and Wells and such relations as W. M. Rossetti and Ford Madox Brown should loom large in the picture, and the whole makes a "life" which surely is one of the very best recently published.—Back to the 'nineties with FIN DE SIECLE, edited

by Nevile Wallis (*Allan Wingate*. 10s. 6d.). In order of preference the illustrations seem to take first place. All are worthy examples of the artists' work and the William Rothenstein portrait drawings and the caricatures (equally portraits) of Max Beerbohm set a standard reached by the others. Next, Holbrook Jackson's "A Note on the Period" is, as would be expected from him, as fair an assessment as could be wished. Then comes Mr. Wallis's Introduction in which commendably he displays that undiminished enthusiasm for *fin de siècle* shared by so many who were born too late. Last of all are the literary selections; not only are there not enough of these but most of them are snippets. The exceptions (excluding Kenneth Grahame's "The Roman Road") were written either before 1890 or "after the turn of the century." Some of the authors, and notably Wilde, are not represented by their better work, due perhaps to copy-right difficulties. In short, one who has long called herself a "ninetyite", greedy for a feast, found crumbs.

Taming wild beasts

Nobody need go hungry to bed with a copy of ORPHEUS, a symposium of the arts, edited by John Lehmann (*John Lehmann*. 12s. 6d.). Any of its contributors who are conscious of their high calling in poetry, prose or paint need feel no apprehension nor affront at this identification with a bedside book. The pre-slumber state demands pieces sufficiently long so that the mind suffers no jerks, sufficiently specialist to avoid the lullaby category by holding the attention, and sufficiently near to one's particular interests. For example: Edith Sitwell's "Some Notes on the Making of a Poem", Norman Marshall's "A Producer in Search of a Play", Norman Nicholson's "The Poet needs an Audience", Bernard Denvir's "Modern French Tapestries", John Lehmann's own delightful "The Man Who Learned to Walk Naked", an appreciation of Yeats, and Osbert Sitwell's "A Short Character of Arnold Bennett", which makes one sorry afresh that *Left Hand*,

Right Hand must some day have an end. In his Foreword John Lehmann says firmly that "the word of the poet is the mainspring of history", and if the theme of poetry is preponderant in these titles, this is not because other subjects are not treated equally carefully by their exponents, nor remain unread.

Artists all

Lavish too is the production of *THE GROWTH OF TWELVE MASTERPIECES* by Charles Johnson (*Phoenix House*. 25s.) with its sixty-one illustrations in colour and monochrome. Such volumes are satisfying simply to handle, and this one has no skin deep beauty. As befits an official lecturer at the National Gallery the author treats his pictures intimately and his readers with consideration. His painters are Ugolino da Siena, Bellini, Antonello da Messina, da Vinci, Titian, el Greco, Rubens, Nicolas Poussin, Watteau, Constable, Ingres and Cézanne. The reading and study awake resolves to visit the London Galleries (too often taken for granted with so many temporary exhibitions to attend) much more frequently, a consequence presumably not displeasing to the author. —And, without ulterior motive, one would like to visit Reginald Turner's widespread gallery too, though a few of the hotels he mentions are already familiar as bygone holiday hosts. His *THE SPOTTED DOG* (*Sylvan Press*. 12s. 6d.) is a book of English inn signs and the wood engravings of these by John Farleigh add much to the character of the book. It has been compiled out of a great deal of erudition and in the pattern are traced religion, heraldry, animal and fish life and agriculture, with the corruptions and oddities that have grown through the centuries. The observant author has some comments about the sort of signs he finds aesthetically satisfying, and their suitable settings. And his reader is often roused to startled agreement, as when he says: "I wish that sign painting had come the way of Rex Whistler."

GRACE BANYARD.